# China's Super Rich Persons (CSRP): A New Dataset on Emerging Private Wealth

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If you are using this dataset for English publications, please cite Lu (2017) in the Appendix or contact Kezhou XIAO (LSE), a corresponding author for this project, for another paper. For Chinese publications, the reference to cite would be Fan and Lu (2019), a paper published in *Social Sciences in China* 中国社会科学 (see the attached English version (translated) in the appendix). Please note that the second paper is using another dataset compiled and maintained by us, China Private Enterprise Survey (CPES), with a larger number of firms and lower entry thresholds.

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# Contents



assistance. Kezhou XIAO declares that he has no financial interest and receives zero sum of funds from this project.

# Chapter 1

# Introduction

实事求是。[Seek truth from facts.] 邓小平[Deng Xiaoping]

The introduction of this dataset aims at making empirical contributions to the study of entrepreneurship and Chinese political economy in light of growing interest in the country's social experiments. Recent work on political economy of China hinges on theoretical treatments of these private entrepreneurs. Political scientists like Truex (2016) looked at how private businessmen and businesswomen entered politics via National People's Congress (NPC). Pei (2016, 2009), for example, asserted that growth under the rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is nothing but another crony capitalist model. In a recent analysis, Piketty et al. (2017) provide a documentation of the evolution of pirvate wealth and inequality between 1978 and 2015.

In a working paper by one of the coauthors of this project (Xiao, 2019), the number of global billionaires from mainland China are documented and analyzed with a conceptual framework[1]. However or not we'd like to interpret these intepretative findings, it is from the socio-scientific standpoint that data gathering efforts are made to tackle these issues, to which our joint iniative seek to respond.

The rest of the codebook is organized as follows. The subsequent section provides the definition and summary statistics of the coded variables. The third section (Appendix I) provides the original survey form in Chinese, a coding manual used by our research assistants. This is followed by two published peer review articles by our coauthors, one originally in English (Lu, 2017) and the other translated from Chinese (Fan and Lu, 2019).

[1]The codebook underlying Xiao (2019) is somewhat different from this one. For more detail, please contact the corresponding author.

# Chapter 2

# Definition of Variables and Coding Rules

This chapter outlines the major data source and definitions used for the research paper. It consists of three sections. The first section provides a detailed definition of the set of variables being coded and the criteria used to code them. The second section offers STATA summary outputs of these coded variables. The final section deals with a few technical issues including missing variables, entry criteria, and others.

**Definition of China's Super Rich Persons (CSRP):** These are the persons or families, who have entered the top 50 list of *Hurun's China Rich List* at least once between 2000 and 2018.

Our coded variables, on the basis of a scheme given to research assistants (see appendix), belong to several aspects: (A) Personal or family information; (B) Occupational experience; (C) Information on political participation; (D) Entry information on Hurun's Rich List; (E) Transgression records; (F) Operating information of the company; and (G) Corporate social responsibility. Part G is missing from CSRP because this section is externally linked and merged with two other dataset: *Guotai* dataset and Funding and social donation dataset.

## 2.1 Coded Variables: Understanding the Human Element of China's Super Rich Persons

The following variables are provided to the best knowledge, as of 2018. The unit of analysis is matched to the person, the human agent of the firm. For most of the variable, the name is self-evident. For others, a brief defining rule is provided.

*Part A: Personal and/or Family Information*

**Variable name: ID**. (label: ID) A numerical case identifier.

**Variable name: S1**. (label: name in Chinese) Character name for the super rich family.

**Variable name: S1a**. (label: Chinese name code) Numerical variable for name code.

**Variable name: S2**. (label: company) Character name for the associated company.

**Variable name: S3**. (label: name in English) English pinyin name for the super rich family.

**Variable name: S3a**. (label:English name code) Numerical variable for name code.

**Variable name: N1**. (label: zip code of the company) A string of zip code of the company with Character names.

**Variable name: N2**. (label: company ID) Numerical variable for the company ID.

**Variable name: N3**. (label: telphone number) Numerical variable for telphone number of the company.

**Variable name: province**. (label: city of company) A numerical code for the city of the company.

**Variable name: gender**. (label: telphone gender) Numerical value for gender information.

**Variable name: ethnicity**. (label: ethnicity) Numerical variable for ethnicity information.

**Variable name: yr_birth**. (label: birth_year) Numerical variable for the year of birth.

**Variable name: yr_dead**. (label: death_year) Numerical variable for the year of death.

**Variable name: birth_pro**. (label: birth_province) Numerical variable for the province of birth.

**Variable name: birth_city**. (label: birth_city) Numerical variable for the city of birth.

**Variable name: hometown**. (label: region of hometown) Numerical variable for the region of hometown.

**Variable name: education**. (label: education) Numerical variable for the level of education.

**Variable name: uni_degree**. (label: university degree) Numerical variable for whether or not the person has a university degree.

**Variable name: uni_name**. (label: university name) String variable for the name of the university.

**Variable name: uni_yr**. (label: year of entering university) Numerical variable for the year of entering university.

**Variable name: uni_level**. (label: university level) Numerical variable for the level and kind of the university education.

**Variable name: major**. (label: major) Numerical variable for the major in college.

**Variable name: study_abroad**. (label: study abroad) Numerical variable for having experience of studying abroad.

**Variable name: wk_abroad**. (label: work abroad) Numerical variable for having experience of working abroad.

**Variable name: partyfa**. (label: father's party) Numerical variable for the person's father's party affiliation.

**Variable name: edufa**. (label: father's education) Numerical variable for the person's father's education.

**Variable name: occfa**. (label: father's occupation) Numerical variable for the person's father's occupation.

**Variable name: sectorfa**. (label: father's sector) Numerical variable for the person's father's sectoral choice.

**Variable name: sector_father**. (label: father's sector) Binary variable for the person's father's sectoral choice.

*Part B: Occupational Experience*

**Variable name: yr_1stjob**. (label: year of the first job) Numerical variable for the year of first job held by the involved person.

**Variable name: yr_selfemp**. (label: year of self-employed) Numerical variable for starting affairs related to private business. *This includes being the head of a collective farm or cooperative.*

**Variable name: pioneer**. (label: pioneer) Numerical variable for starting the company before 1992 or after 1992 (inclusive).

**Variable name: occ_mobility**. (label: career experience before self-employed) String variable for career experience.

**Variable name: occlast**. (label: last occupation before self-employed) Numerical variable for the kind of last occupation before setting up the company.

**Variable name: sectorlast**. (label: the sector of last occupation before self-employed) Numerical variable for the sectoral category of last occupation before setting up the company.

**Variable name: sectorlast**. (label: last sector before self-employed) Numerical variable for the sector of last occupation before setting up the company.

**Variable name: state_exp**. (label: state sector experience) Numerical variable for administrative level before setting up the company.

**Variable name: adm_level**. (label: offical level) Numerical variable for administrative level before setting up the company.

*Part C: Information on Political Participation*

**Variable name: party**. (label: political titles) String variable for party information.

**Variable name: pol_status**. (label: party affiliation) Numerical variable for party affliation.

**Variable name: yr_party**. (label: beginning year of party membership) Numerical variable for the beginning year of the party.

**Variable name: NPC_Province**. (label: Provincial NPC deputy) Numerical variable for being a provincial level National People's Congress (NPC) deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_p1**. (label: congress number-congress p1) Numerical variable for the provincial level congress number of being a first-time provincial level deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_p1beg**. (label: beginning year-congress p1) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a first-time provincial level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_p1ove**. (label: ending year-congress p1) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a first-time provincial level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: NPCP1SCM**. (label: standing committee-congress p1) Numerical variable for being part of the standing committee as a first-time provincial level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_p2**. (label: congress number-congress p2) Numerical variable for the provincial congress number of being second-time provincial level deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_p2beg**. (label: beginning year-congress p2) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a second-time provincial level deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_p2ove**. (label: ending year-congress p2) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a second-time provincial level deputy.

**Variable name: NPCP2SCM**. (label: standing committee-congress p1) Numerical variable for being part of the standing committee as a second-time provincial level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_Country**. (label: NPC deputy on the national level) Numerical variable for being part of the standing committee as a second-time provincial leveldeputy.

**Variable name: NPC_n1**. (label: congress number-congress n1) Numerical variable for the congress number of being a first-time national deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_n1beg**. (label: beginning year-congress n1) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a first-time national deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_n1ove**. (label: ending year-congress n1) Numerical varianle for the ending year of being a first-time national deputy.

**Variable name: NPCN1SCM**. (label: standing committee-congress n1) Numerical variable for being a first-time national level National People's Congress (NPC) deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_n2**. (label: congress number-congress n2) Numerical variable for the congress number of being a second-time national deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_n2beg**. (label: beginning year-congress n2) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a second-time national deputy.

**Variable name: NPC_n2ove**. (label: ending year-congress n2) Numerical varianle for the ending year of being a second-time national deputy.

**Variable name: NPCN2SCM**. (label: standing committee-congress n1) Numerical variable for being a second-time national level National People's Congress (NPC) deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_Province**. (label: Provincial CPPCC deputy) Numerical variable for being a provincial level Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_p1**. (label: cppcc number-cppcc p1) Numerical variable for the provincial CPPCC number of being a first-time provincial level deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_p1beg**. (label: beginning year-cppcc p1) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a first-time provincial level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_p1ove**. (label: ending year-cppcc p1) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a first-time provincial level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCCP1SCM**. (label: standing committee-cppcc p1) Numerical variable for being part of the standing committee as a first-time provincial level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_p2**. (label: cppcc number-cppcc p2) Numerical variable for the provincial CPPCC number of being a second-time provincial level deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_p2beg**. (label: beginning year-cppcc p2) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a second-time provincial level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_p2ove**. (label: ending year-cppcc p2) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a second-time provincial level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCCP2SCM**. (label: standing committee-cppcc p2) Numerical variable for being part of the standing committee as a second-time provincial level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_Country**. (label: Country level CPPCC deputy) Numerical variable for being a country level Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n1**. (label: cppcc number-cppcc n1) Numerical variable for the national CPPCC number of being a first-time national level deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n1beg**. (label: beginning year-cppcc n1) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a first-time national level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n1ove**. (label: ending year-cppcc n1) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a first-time national level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCCN1SCM**. (label: standing committee-cppcc n1) Numerical variable for being part of the standing committee as a first-time national level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n2**. (label: cppcc number-cppcc n2) Numerical variable for the national CPPCC number of being a second-time national level deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n2beg**. (label: beginning year-cppcc n2) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a second-time national level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n2ove**. (label: ending year-cppcc n2) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a second-time national level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCCN2SCM**. (label: standing committee-cppcc n2) Numerical variable for being part of the standing committee as a second-time national level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n3**. (label: cppcc number-cppcc n3) Numerical variable for the national CPPCC number of being a third-time national level deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n3beg**. (label: beginning year-cppcc n3) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a third-time national level NPC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCC_n3ove**. (label: ending year-cppcc n3) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a third-time national level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: CPPCCN3SCM**. (label: standing committee-cppcc n3) Numerical variable for being part of the standing committee as a third-time national level CPPCC deputy.

**Variable name: Party_representative**. (label: representative of CPCC) Numerical variable for being a first-time communist party national level deputy.

**Variable name: CPCC_r1**. (label: CPCC-r1) Numerical variable for the CPCC number of being a first-time communist party national level deputy.

**Variable name: CPCC_r1beg**. (label: beginning year-cpcc r1) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a first-time communist party national level deputy.

**Variable name: CPCC_r1ove**. (label: ending year-cpcc r1) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a first-time communist party national level deputy.

**Variable name: AFCIC_province**. (label: Member of AFCIC at the provincial level) Numerical variable for being a member of the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (AFCIC) at the provincial level.

**Variable name: AFCIC_p1**. (label: AFCIC-p1) Numerical variable for being a member of the Member of AFCIC at the provincial level (first time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_p1beg**. (label: beginning year-AFCIC p1) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a member of AFCIC at the provincial level (first time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_p1ove**. (label: ending year-AFCIC p1) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a member of AFCIC at the provincial level (first time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_p1VP**. (label: AFCIC-p1VP) Numerical variable for being at least VP of AFCIC at the provincial level (first time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_p2**. (label: AFCIC-p2) Numerical variable for being a member of the Member of AFCIC at the provincial level (second time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_p2beg**. (label: beginning year-AFCIC p2) Numerical variable for the CPCC number of being a member of AFCIC at the provincial level (second time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_p2ove**. (label: ending year-AFCIC p2) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a member of AFCIC at the provincial level (second time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_p2VP**. (label: AFCIC-p2VP) Numerical variable for being at least VP of AFCIC at the provincial level (second time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_nation**. (label: Member of AFCIC at the national level) Numerical variable for being a member of AFCIC at the national level.

**Variable name: AFCIC_n1**. (label: AFCIC-n1) Numerical variable for being a member of the Member of AFCIC at the national level (first time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_n1beg**. (label: beginning year-AFCIC n1) Numerical variable for the beginning year of being a member of AFCIC at the national level (first time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_n1ove**. (label: ending year-AFCIC n1) Numerical variable for the ending year of being a member of AFCIC at the national level (first time).

**Variable name: AFCIC_n1VP**. (label: AFCIC-n1VP) Numerical variable for being at least VP of AFCIC at the national level (first time).

*Part D: Entry Information on Hurun's Rich List*

**Variable name: rank00**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2000) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2000.

**Variable name: rank01**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2001) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2001.

**Variable name: rank02**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2002) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2002.

**Variable name: rank03**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2003) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2003.

**Variable name: rank04**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2004) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2004.

**Variable name: rank05**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2005) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2005.

**Variable name: rank06**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2006) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2006.

**Variable name: rank07**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2007) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2007.

**Variable name: rank08**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2008) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2008.

**Variable name: rank09**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2009) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2009.

**Variable name: rank10**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2010) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2010.

**Variable name: rank11**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2011) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2011.

**Variable name: rank12**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2012) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2012.

**Variable name: rank13**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2013) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2013.

**Variable name: rank14**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2014) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2014.

**Variable name: rank15**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2015) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2015.

**Variable name: rank16**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2016) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2016.

**Variable name: rank17**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2017) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2017.

**Variable name: rank18**. (label: Hurun ranking in 2018) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List in year 2018.

**Variable name: rankhigh**. (label: Highest Hurun ranking) Numerical variable for the highest ranking at Hurun's Rich List between 2000 and 2018.

**Variable name: ranklow**. (label: lowest Hurun ranking) Numerical variable for the ranking at Hurun's Rich List between 2000 and 2018.

**Variable name: wealth00**. (label: Hurun capital in 2000) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2000.

**Variable name: wealth01**. (label: Hurun capital in 2001) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2001.

**Variable name: wealth02**. (label: Hurun capital in 2002) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2002.

**Variable name: wealth03**. (label: Hurun capital in 2003) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2003.

**Variable name: wealth03**. (label: Hurun capital in 2003) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2003.

**Variable name: wealth04**. (label: Hurun capital in 2004) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2004.

**Variable name: wealth05**. (label: Hurun capital in 2005) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2005.

**Variable name: wealth06**. (label: Hurun capital in 2006) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2006.

**Variable name: wealth07**. (label: Hurun capital in 2007) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2007.

**Variable name: wealth08**. (label: Hurun capital in 2008) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2008.

**Variable name: wealth09**. (label: Hurun capital in 2009) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2009.

**Variable name: wealth10**. (label: Hurun capital in 2010) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2010.

**Variable name: wealth11**. (label: Hurun capital in 2011) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2011.

**Variable name: wealth12**. (label: Hurun capital in 2012) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2012.

**Variable name: wealth13**. (label: Hurun capital in 2013) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2013.

**Variable name: wealth14**. (label: Hurun capital in 2014) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2014.

**Variable name: wealth15**. (label: Hurun capital in 2015) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2015.

**Variable name: wealth16**. (label: Hurun capital in 2016) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2016.

**Variable name: wealth17**. (label: Hurun capital in 2017) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2017.

**Variable name: wealth18**. (label: Hurun capital in 2018) Numerical variable for the amount of wealth at Hurun's Rich List in year 2018.

*Part E: Transgression Records*

**Variable name: cr_offense**. (label: criminal offense) Numerical variable for whether or not the person has committed criminal offenses.

**Variable name: yr_verdict**. (label: year of verdict) Numerical variable for the year of verdict by the court.

**Variable name: type_crime**. (label: type of crime) String variable for the type of crime.

**Variable name: control**. (label: control) Numerical variable for being put under control by law enforcement.

**Variable name: detention**. (label: detention) Numerical variable for being put under detention by law enforcement.

**Variable name: lim_imprison**. (label: limited term imprisonment) Numerical

variable for being put under limited-term imprisonment.

**Variable name: lif_imprison**. (label: life imprisonment ) Numerical variable for being put under life imprisonment.

**Variable name: postponed_death**. (label: postponed death sentence ) Numerical variable for being put under postponed death sentence.

**Variable name: death**. (label: death) Numerical variable for being put under death sentence by law enforcement.

**Variable name: penalty**. (label: penalty) Numerical variable for whether or not there are additional penalties.

**Variable name: Depr_PR**. (label: deprivation of political rights) Numerical variable for being deprived of political rights

**Variable name: confiscation**. (label: confiscation of property) Numerical variable for having property confiscated by law enforcement.

**Variable name: norm_serve**. (label: serving normal sentence) Numerical variable for serving a normal sentence.

**Variable name: commuted_serve**. (label: serving commuted sentence) Numerical variable for being put under detention by law enforcement.

**Variable name: release**. (label: released from prison) Numerical variable for being released from prison.

**Variable name: exile**. (label: exile abroad) Numerical variable for having been in exile abroad.

**Variable name: corr_town**. (label: corruption official town level) Numerical variable for having implicated town-level official in a corruption case.

**Variable name: corr_county**. (label: corruption official county level) Numerical variable for having implicated county-level official in a corruption case.

**Variable name: corr_city**. (label: corruption official city level) Numerical variable for having implicated city-evel official in a corruption case.

**Variable name: corr_province**. (label: corruption official provincial level) Numerical variable for having implicated provincial level official in a corruption case.

**Variable name: corr_nation**. (label: corruption official national level) Numerical variable for having implicated national level official in a corruption case.

**Variable name: corr_politburo**. (label: corruption official politburo level) Numerical variable for having implicated politburo level official in a corruption case.

*Part E: Operating Information of the Company*

**Variable name: yr_begin**. (label: beginning year of the company) Numerical variable for the start year of the company.

**Variable name: type_1st**. (label: category of company in the beginning) Numerical variable for the category of company in the beginning.

**Variable name: type_now**. (label: category of company now (2018)) Numerical variable for the category of company now (as of 2018).

**Variable name: restructure**. (label: history of restructuring or privatization) Numerical variable for having a history of SOE restructuring or privatization.

**Variable name: yr_restructure**. (label: beginning year of the company) Numerical variable for the year of company restructuring.

**Variable name: restructure_old**. (label: original category of company) Numerical variable for the original category of company before restructuring.

**Variable name: industry**. (label: industry) String variable for the main industries of the company.

**Variable name: industry1**. (label: industry1) String variable for another main industries of the company.

**Variable name: industry2**. (label: industry2) String variable for another main industries of the company.

**Variable name: industry3**. (label: industry3) String variable for a third main industries of the company.

**Variable name: list**. (label: list) Numerical variable for whether or not the company is listed.

**Variable name: region**. (label: region of the company) Numerical variable for whether or not the company is listed.

## 2.2 Summary of the Variables

This section offers a detailed summary of the collected variables. For each variable, we record the type, label, range, unique values, and examples.

```
             Dataset:  CSRP190310.dta
           Last saved:  10 Mar 2019 8:08
                        DATA HAVE CHANGED SINCE LAST SAVED

               Label:  China's Super Rich Persons dataset version 1.3
 Number of variables:  174
Number of observations:  443
                Size:  1,651,947 bytes ignoring labels, etc.
```

---

**ID** **ID**

---

```
                type:  numeric (long)

               range:  [2.000e+09,2.018e+09]        units:  1
        unique values:  443                      missing .:  0/443

                mean:   2.0e+09
            std. dev:   5.2e+06

         percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                          2.0e+09   2.0e+09   2.0e+09   2.0e+09   2.0e+09
```

---

**S1** **name in Chinese**

---

```
                type:  string (str244), but longest is str31

        unique values:  443                      missing "":  0/443

            examples:  "姜伟家族"
                       "曹明芳"
                       "沈雯"
                       "车建新"
```

warning: variable has embedded blanks

---

**S1a** **Chinese name code**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **S1a**

range: [**1,443**] units: **1**
unique values: **443** missing **.**: **0/443**

examples: **88** 沈家桑
**177** 朱志平
**265** 任元林
**354** 王文学

---

**S2** **company**

---

type: string (**str244**), but longest is str90

unique values: **431** missing "": **0/443**

examples: **"分众传媒"**
**"家世界"**
**"正荣"**
**"福禧投资集团"**

warning: variable has embedded blanks

---

**S3** **name in English**

---

type: string (**str244**), but longest is str29

unique values: **442** missing "": **0/443**

examples: **"LIANG Qingde"**
**"XIAO Yongming"**
**"DU Jiangtao"**
**"WANG Guangxi&GUO Tianshu"**

warning: variable has leading and embedded blanks

**S3a** — **English name code**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **S3a** |
| range: | [**1,443**] |
| unique values: | **443** |
| units: | **1** |
| missing .: | **0/443** |

examples:
**88** SHEN Jiasang
**177** ZHU Zhiping
**265** REN Yuanlin
**354** WANG Wenxue

**N1** — **zip code of company**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **N1**, but label does not exist |
| range: | [**100000,999077**] |
| unique values: | **118** |
| units: | **1** |
| missing .: | **3/443** |
| mean: | **353603** |
| std. dev: | **197012** |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **110102** | **210900** | **330550** | **440300** | **510100** |

**N2** — **company ID**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | string (**str244**), but longest is str20 |
| unique values: | **403** |
| missing "": | **0/443** |

examples:
**"310115001887344"**
**"9112011605207452X0"**
**"91330000142911934W"**
**"91440101231251149E"**

warning: variable has leading and trailing blanks

**N3** — **telphone number**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**int**) | | |
| range: | [**10,991**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **114** | missing .: | **1/443** |
| mean: | **375.975** | | |
| std. dev: | **319.139** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **10** | **22** | **413.5** | **701** | **769** |

**province** — **city of company**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **province** | | |
| range: | [**11,81**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **29** | missing .: | **2/443** |

| examples: | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **13** | Hebei |
| | **32** | Jiangsu |
| | **37** | Shandong |
| | **44** | Guangdong |

**gender** — **gender**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **gender** | | |
| range: | [**0,1**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **2** | missing .: | **0/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **18** | **0** | female |
| | **425** | **1** | male |

**ethnicity** — **ethnicity**

```
            type:  numeric (double)
           label:  ethnicity

           range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
  unique values:  2                          missing .:  0/443

      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      10         0  minority
                     433         1  han
```

---

**yr_birth** **birth_year**

---

```
            type:  numeric (double)

           range:  [1931,1986]                  units:  1
  unique values:  46                         missing .:  7/443

            mean:   1960.05
       std. dev:   8.46792

     percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                        1949      1955    1961.5      1965      1970
```

---

**yr_death** **death_year**

---

```
            type:  numeric (double)

           range:  [2001,2017]                  units:  1
  unique values:  5                          missing .:  436/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                       1  2001
                       1  2003
                       2  2014
                       2  2015
                       1  2017
                     436  .
```

---

**birth_pro** **birth_province**

---

```
            type:  numeric (double)
           label:  birth_pro
```

range: [11,65] units: 1
unique values: 28 missing .: 3/443

examples: 31 Shanghai
33 Zhejiang
37 Shandong
44 Guangdong

---

**birth_city** **birth_city**

---

type: string (**str244**), but longest is str15

unique values: 187 missing "": 0/443

examples: "丹东"
"宁波"
"梅州"
"绍兴"

warning: variable has leading and trailing blanks

---

**education** **education**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **education**

range: [1,6] units: 1
unique values: 6 missing .: 61/443

tabulation:

| Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|
| 89 | 1 | BelowJunior |
| 56 | 2 | High |
| 50 | 3 | Associate |
| 133 | 4 | Undergraduate |
| 47 | 5 | Master |
| 7 | 6 | Doctor |
| 61 | . | |

---

**uni_degree** **university degree**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **degree**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [0,1] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 2 | missing .: | 62/443 |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|
| 140 | 0 | no |
| 241 | 1 | yes |
| 62 | . | |

---

**uni_name** — **university name**

---

type: string (**str244**), but longest is str113

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unique values: | 143 | missing "": | 0/443 |

examples:
""
""
"中国人民大学"
"悉尼科技大学"

warning: variable has leading, embedded, and trailing blanks

---

**uni_yr** — **year of entering university**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [1954,2000] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 30 | missing .: | 311/443 |
| mean: | 1983.39 | | |
| std. dev: | 6.92794 | | |

percentiles:

| 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1978 | 1980 | 1984 | 1987 | 1990 |

---

**uni_level** — **university level**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **uni_level**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [1,5] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 5 | missing .: | 261/443 |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 8 | 1 | FOU |
| | 3 | 2 | OOU |
| | 1 | 3 | MilitaryU |
| | 95 | 4 | 985211 |
| | 75 | 5 | ordinary |
| | 261 | . | |

---

**major** **major**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **major**

range: [**1,17**] units: **1**
unique values: **16** missing .: **264/443**

examples: **5** OtherEngineering
**16** EduPsyLibraryInformation
**.**
**.**

---

**stdy_abroad** **study abroad**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **stdy_abroad**

range: [**0,1**] units: **1**
unique values: **2** missing .: **9/443**

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 418 | 0 | no |
| | 16 | 1 | yes |
| | 9 | . | |

---

**wk_abroad** **work_abroad**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **wk_abroad**

range: [**0,1**] units: **1**
unique values: **2** missing .: **144/443**

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **285** | **0** | no |
| | **14** | **1** | yes |
| | **144** | **.** | |

---

**partyfa** — **father's party**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **partyfa**

range: [**1,5**] units: **1**
unique values: **5** missing .: **0/443**

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **41** | **1** | Communist |
| | **4** | **2** | Democratic |
| | **201** | **3** | Masses |
| | **2** | **4** | GMD |
| | **195** | **5** | unclear |

---

**edufa** — **father's education**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **edufa**

range: [**1,6**] units: **1**
unique values: **6** missing .: **236/443**

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **103** | **1** | Junior |
| | **67** | **2** | Highschool |
| | **23** | **3** | College |
| | **11** | **4** | Undergrad |
| | **2** | **5** | Master |
| | **1** | **6** | PhD |
| | **236** | **.** | |

---

**occfa** — **father's occupation**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **occ**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [1,20] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 16 | missing .: | 0/443 |

examples:
- 6 manager in PE
- 12 WorkForFamilyC
- 17 farmer
- 20 Others

---

**sectorfa** — **father's sector**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **sector**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [1,12] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 9 | missing .: | 0/443 |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|
| 20 | 1 | gov |
| 14 | 2 | public |
| 57 | 3 | SOE |
| 4 | 5 | Rural_org |
| 57 | 6 | Farmer |
| 7 | 7 | FamilyFirm |
| 42 | 8 | PE |
| 11 | 10 | Self_employed |
| 231 | 12 | Others |

---

**yr_1stjob** — **year of the first job**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [1896,2006] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 47 | missing .: | 31/443 |

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | 1981.41 |
| std. dev: | 9.19109 |

percentiles:

| 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1971 | 1977 | 1982 | 1987 | 1991 |

---

**yr_selfemp** — **year of self-employed**

---

```
                type:  numeric (double)

               range:  [1967,2013]                  units:  1
        unique values:  37                       missing .:  13/443

                mean:   1991.04
            std. dev:   6.38222

         percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                          1982.5      1987      1992      1995      1999
```

---

**pioneer** **pioneer**

---

```
                type:  numeric (double)
               label:  pioneer

               range:  [1,2]                        units:  1
        unique values:  2                        missing .:  15/443

          tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                         220         1  pioneer
                         208         2  newcomer
                          15         .
```

---

**occ_mobility** **career experience before self-employed**

---

```
                type:  string (str366)

        unique values:  395                      missing "":  0/443

            examples:  "1971年后，邱光和从部队回到了家乡，成了人民公社半脱
> 产
                       干部，负责过宣传、民兵、共青团工作，还受公社委派担任
                       过社队企业的厂长和书记。1984年，他和两个朋友一起创办
                       了瓯海娄桥工贸公司。1988年7月，几个朋友开始分开，邱
> 光
                       和便创办瓯海家用电器公司。"
                       "1983年毕业分配到浙江省东阳县横店镇成为一名“乡官”，
> 后
                       成为公社书记的助手；徐文荣动员他去横店集团当秘书。19
> 9
                       8年在乳源成立乳源裕东实业有限公司；"
                       "1993年辞职，从重庆跑到成都，混迹于红庙子，跟那些股
> 票
                       炒家和资金贩子“勾兑”。1994年的时候，他找工商行的旧同
```

事做担保，向一个做房地产的包工头借了20万，加上自己的
一点积累，承包了一家信用社(这个做法在当时很流行，后
> 被
禁止)。1996年 后，四川立信，公司"
"在复员回到上海之后，王树清成为一名检察官，通过自己
> 的
勤奋工作他在二十七八岁时就是处级干部。"

warning: variable has leading, embedded, and trailing blanks

---

**occlast** **last occupation before self-employed**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **occ**

range: [**1**,**18**] units: **1**
unique values: **18** missing .: **45/443**

examples: **4** clerk in SOE
**8** Employee in PE
**14** VillageCadres
**18** manager in collective company

---

**state_exp** **state sector experience**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **state_exp**

range: [**0**,**2**] units: **1**
unique values: **3** missing .: **2/443**

tabulation:

| Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|
| **215** | **0** | no |
| **180** | **1** | yes |
| **46** | **2** | unclear |
| **2** | **.** | |

---

**adm_level** **offical level**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **adm_level**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [1,6] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 6 | missing .: | 55/443 |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 283 | 1 | nothing |
| | 21 | 2 | Clerk |
| | 42 | 3 | keji |
| | 29 | 4 | chuji |
| | 12 | 5 | juji |
| | 1 | 6 | buji |
| | 55 | . | |

---

**party** — **political titles**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | string (**str361**) | | |
| unique values: | 210 | missing "": | 0/443 |

examples: ""
""
"山东省政协委员、山东省工商联副会长、全国工商联常委"
"第十一、十二、十三届天津市政协委员"

warning: variable has leading, embedded, and trailing blanks

---

**pol_status** — **party affiliation**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **pol_status** | | |
| range: | [1,3] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 3 | missing .: | 0/443 |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 117 | 1 | Communist |
| | 24 | 2 | Democratic |
| | 302 | 3 | Masses |

---

**yr_party** — **beginning year of party membership**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **yr_party**, but **23** nonmissing values are not labeled

```
        range:  [0,2004]                    units:  1
unique values:  24                       missing .:  107/443

     examples:  0     no
                0     no
                0     no
                .
```

---

**NPC_Province** — **Provincial NPC deputy**

---

```
         type:  numeric (double)
        label:  NPC_Province

        range:  [0,1]                       units:  1
unique values:  2                        missing .:  0/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                  382         0  no
                   61         1  yes
```

---

**NPC_p1** — **congress number-congress p1**

---

```
         type:  numeric (double)
        label:  C2B1A, but label does not exist

        range:  [4,14]                      units:  1
unique values:  9                        missing .:  409/443

   tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                    1  4
                    1  6
                    1  8
                    6  9
                   10  10
                    4  11
                    7  12
                    3  13
                    1  14
                  409  .
```

---

**NPC_p1beg** — **beginning year-congress p1**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **C2B1B**, but label does not exist

range: [**1983,2018**] units: **1**
unique values: **8** missing .: **384/443**

tabulation: Freq. Value
**1 1983**
**4 1993**
**1 1997**
**8 1998**
**21 2003**
**11 2008**
**11 2013**
**2 2018**
**384 .**

---

**NPC_p1ove** **ending year-congress p1**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **C2B1C**, but label does not exist

range: [**1988,2018**] units: **1**
unique values: **8** missing .: **394/443**

tabulation: Freq. Value
**1 1988**
**4 1998**
**4 2003**
**14 2008**
**1 2010**
**6 2013**
**2 2015**
**17 2018**
**394 .**

---

**NPCP1SCM** **standing committee-congress p1**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **NPCP1SCM**

range: [**0,1**] units: **1**
unique values: **2** missing .: **0/443**

```
      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                     440         0  no
                       3         1  yes
```

---

**NPC_p2** — **congress number-congress p2**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C2B2A, but label does not exist

             range:  [12,13]                      units:  1
      unique values:  2                       missing .:  441/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                       1  12
                       1  13
                     441  .
```

---

**NPC_p2beg** — **beginning year-congress p2**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C2B2B, but label does not exist

             range:  [2018,2018]                  units:  1
      unique values:  1                       missing .:  442/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                       1  2018
                     442  .
```

---

**NPC_p2ove** — **ending year-congress p2**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C2B2C, but label does not exist

             range:  [.,.]                        units:  .
      unique values:  0                       missing .:  443/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                     443  .
```

**NPCP2SCM** — **standing committee-congress p2**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **NPCP2SCM** | | |
| range: | [**0**,**0**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **1** | missing .: | **2/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **441** | **0** | no |
| | **2** | **.** | |

**NPC_Country** — **NPC deputy on the national level**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **NPC_Country** | | |
| range: | [**0**,**1**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **2** | missing .: | **0/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **364** | **0** | no |
| | **79** | **1** | yes |

**NPC_n1** — **congress number-congress n1**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C3B1A**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [**9**,**13**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **5** | missing .: | **411/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Value |
|---|---|---|
| | **2** | **9** |
| | **7** | **10** |
| | **5** | **11** |
| | **9** | **12** |
| | **9** | **13** |
| | **411** | **.** |

**NPC_n1beg** — **beginning year-congress n1**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **C3B1B**, but label does not exist |
| range: | [**1983,2018**] |
| unique values: | **8** |
| units: | **1** |
| missing .: | **365/443** |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Value |
|---|---|
| **1** | **1983** |
| **2** | **1993** |
| **9** | **1998** |
| **2** | **2002** |
| **21** | **2003** |
| **21** | **2008** |
| **13** | **2013** |
| **9** | **2018** |
| **365** | **.** |

**NPC_n1ove** — **ending year-congress n1**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **C3B1C**, but label does not exist |
| range: | [**1993,2018**] |
| unique values: | **10** |
| units: | **1** |
| missing .: | **386/443** |
| mean: | **2012.3** |
| std. dev: | **5.52903** |

percentiles:

| 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2006** | **2008** | **2013** | **2018** | **2018** |

**NPCN1SCM** — **standing committee-congress n1**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **NPCN1SCM** |
| range: | [**0,1**] |
| unique values: | **2** |
| units: | **1** |
| missing .: | **0/443** |

```
      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                     440         0  no
                       3         1  yes
```

---

**NPC_n2** **congress number-congress n2**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C3B2A, but label does not exist

             range:  [10,13]                      units:  1
      unique values:  4                       missing .:  433/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                       1  10
                       2  11
                       3  12
                       4  13
                     433  .
```

---

**NPC_n2beg** **beginning year-congress n2**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C3B2B, but label does not exist

             range:  [2003,2018]                  units:  1
      unique values:  4                       missing .:  432/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                       1  2003
                       2  2008
                       4  2013
                       4  2018
                     432  .
```

---

**NPC_n2ove** **ending year-congress n2**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C3B2C, but label does not exist

             range:  [2008,2018]                  units:  1
      unique values:  3                       missing .:  437/443
```

```
      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                       1  2008
                       2  2013
                       3  2018
                     437  .
```

---

**NPCN2SCM** — **standing committee-congress n2**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  NPCN2SCM

             range:  [0,0]                        units:  1
      unique values:  1                       missing .:  0/443

      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                     443         0  no
```

---

**CPPCC_Province** — **Provincial CPPCC deputy**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  CPPCC_Province

             range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
      unique values:  2                       missing .:  0/443

      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                     381         0  no
                      62         1  yes
```

---

**CPPCC_p1** — **cppcc number-cppcc p1**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C4B1A, but label does not exist

             range:  [6,13]                       units:  1
      unique values:  8                       missing .:  414/443
```

| tabulation: | Freq. | Value |
|---|---|---|
| | **1** | **6** |
| | **1** | **7** |
| | **3** | **8** |
| | **7** | **9** |
| | **5** | **10** |
| | **4** | **11** |
| | **6** | **12** |
| | **2** | **13** |
| | **414** | **.** |

---

**CPPCC_p1beg** — **beginning year-cppcc p1**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C4B1B**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [**1983,2018**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **11** | missing .: | **388/443** |
| mean: | **2003.56** | | |
| std. dev: | **7.60546** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **1993** | **1998** | **2003** | **2008** | **2013** |

---

**CPPCC_p1ove** — **ending year-cppcc p1**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C4B1C**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [**1993,2018**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **10** | missing .: | **394/443** |
| mean: | **2009.31** | | |
| std. dev: | **6.4814** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **2003** | **2003** | **2008** | **2013** | **2018** |

---

**CPPCCP1SCM** — **standing committee-cppcc p1**

---

```
            type:  numeric (double)
           label:  CPPCCP1SCM

           range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
  unique values:  2                         missing .:  0/443

      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                     423         0  no
                      20         1  yes
```

---

**CPPCC_p2** — **cppcc number-cppcc p2**

---

```
            type:  numeric (double)
           label:  C4B2A, but label does not exist

           range:  [9,13]                       units:  1
  unique values:  5                         missing .:  432/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                     1  9
                     5  10
                     2  11
                     2  12
                     1  13
                   432  .
```

---

**CPPCC_p2beg** — **beginning year-cppcc p2**

---

```
            type:  numeric (double)
           label:  C4B2B, but label does not exist

           range:  [1998,2018]                  units:  1
  unique values:  5                         missing .:  431/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                     1  1998
                     5  2003
                     1  2008
                     3  2013
                     2  2018
                   431  .
```

**CPPCC_p2ove** — **ending year-cppcc p2**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **C4B2C**, but label does not exist |
| range: | [**2003,2018**] |
| unique values: | **5** |
| units: | **1** |
| missing .: | **433/443** |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Value |
|---|---|
| **1** | **2003** |
| **4** | **2008** |
| **1** | **2013** |
| **1** | **2017** |
| **3** | **2018** |
| **433** | **.** |

**CPPCCP2SCM** — **standing committee-cppcc p2**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **CPPCCP2SCM** |
| range: | [**0,1**] |
| unique values: | **2** |
| units: | **1** |
| missing .: | **2/443** |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|
| **435** | **0** | no |
| **6** | **1** | yes |
| **2** | **.** | |

**CPPCC_Country** — **Country level CPPCC deputy**

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **CPPCC_Country** |
| range: | [**0,1**] |
| unique values: | **2** |
| units: | **1** |
| missing .: | **0/443** |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|
| **360** | **0** | no |
| **83** | **1** | yes |

**CPPCC_n1** — **cppcc number-cppcc n1**

```
                type:  numeric (double)
               label:  C5B1A, but label does not exist

               range:  [2,13]                       units:  1
        unique values:  6                        missing .:  412/443

          tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                         1  2
                         1  9
                         4  10
                         5  11
                         5  12
                        15  13
                       412  .
```

**CPPCC_n1beg** — **beginning year-cppcc n1**

```
                type:  numeric (double)
               label:  C5B1B, but label does not exist

               range:  [1988,2018]                  units:  1
        unique values:  9                        missing .:  360/443

          tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                         1  1988
                         5  1993
                        13  1998
                         1  2002
                        20  2003
                         1  2005
                        14  2008
                        13  2013
                        15  2018
                       360  .
```

**CPPCC_n1ove** — **ending year-cppcc n1**

```
                type:  numeric (double)
               label:  C5B1C, but label does not exist
```

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [1998,2018] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 6 | missing .: | 389/443 |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Value |
|---|---|
| 1 | 1998 |
| 5 | 2003 |
| 1 | 2006 |
| 13 | 2008 |
| 14 | 2013 |
| 20 | 2018 |
| 389 | . |

---

**CPPCCN1SCM** — **standing committee-cppcc n1**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **CPPCCN1SCM** | | |
| range: | [0,1] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 2 | missing .: | 0/443 |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|
| 435 | 0 | no |
| 8 | 1 | yes |

---

**CPPCC_n2** — **cppcc number-cppcc n2**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C5B2A**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [11,13] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 3 | missing .: | 437/443 |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Value |
|---|---|
| 2 | 11 |
| 2 | 12 |
| 2 | 13 |
| 437 | . |

---

**CPPCC_n2beg** — **beginning year-cppcc n2**

---

| | |
|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) |
| label: | **C5B2B**, but label does not exist |

```
        range:  [2008,2018]                 units:  1
unique values:  3                       missing .:  433/443

   tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                    3  2008
                    5  2013
                    2  2018
                  433  .
```

---

**CPPCC_n2ove** — **ending year-cppcc n2**

---

```
         type:  numeric (double)
        label:  C5B2C, but label does not exist

        range:  [2013,2018]                 units:  1
unique values:  2                       missing .:  437/443

   tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                    2  2013
                    4  2018
                  437  .
```

---

**CPPCCN2SCM** — **standing committee-cppcc n2**

---

```
         type:  numeric (double)
        label:  CPPCCN2SCM

        range:  [0,1]                       units:  1
unique values:  2                       missing .:  1/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                  435         0  no
                    7         1  yes
                    1         .
```

---

**CPPCC_n3** — **cppcc number-cppcc n3**

---

```
         type:  numeric (double)
        label:  C5B3A, but label does not exist

        range:  [12,12]                     units:  1
unique values:  1                       missing .:  442/443
```

```
      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                      1  12
                    442  .
```

---

**CPPCC_n3beg** — **beginning year-cppcc n3**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C5B3B, but label does not exist

             range:  [2013,2013]                  units:  1
      unique values:  1                       missing .:  442/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                      1  2013
                    442  .
```

---

**CPPCC_n3ove** — **ending year-cppcc n3**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  C5B3C, but label does not exist

             range:  [2018,2018]                  units:  1
      unique values:  1                       missing .:  442/443

      tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                      1  2018
                    442  .
```

---

**CPPCCN3SCM** — **standing committee-cppcc n3**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  CPPCCN3SCM

             range:  [0,0]                        units:  1
      unique values:  1                       missing .:  0/443

      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                    443         0  no
```

---

**Party_representative** — **representative of CPCC**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  Party_representative

            range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
      unique values:  2                       missing .:  0/443

       tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      430         0  no
                       13         1  yes
```

---

**CPCC_r1** **CPCC_r1**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  C6B1A, but label does not exist

            range:  [11,17]                      units:  1
      unique values:  4                       missing .:  437/443

       tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                        1  11
                        1  12
                        2  16
                        2  17
                      437  .
```

---

**CPCC_r1beg** **beginning year-CPCC r1**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  C6B1B, but label does not exist

            range:  [1982,2012]                  units:  1
      unique values:  5                       missing .:  431/443

       tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                        1  1982
                        1  1987
                        5  2002
                        4  2007
                        1  2012
                      431  .
```

---

**CPCC_r1ove** **ending year-CPCC r1**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  C6B1C, but label does not exist

            range:  [1987,2017]                  units:  1
      unique values:  5                        missing .:  431/443

       tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                       1  1987
                       1  1997
                       4  2007
                       3  2012
                       3  2017
                     431  .
```

---

**AFCIC_province**
**Member of All China Federation of Industry and Committee at the provincial le > vel**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  FC_Province, but label does not exist

            range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
      unique values:  2                        missing .:  0/443

       tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                     344  0
                      99  1
```

---

**AFCIC_p1** **All China Federation of Industry and Committee-p1**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  C7B1A, but label does not exist

            range:  [8,14]                       units:  1
      unique values:  7                        missing .:  404/443
```

| tabulation: | Freq. | Value |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 8 |
| | 2 | 9 |
| | 5 | 10 |
| | 12 | 11 |
| | 12 | 12 |
| | 3 | 13 |
| | 4 | 14 |
| | 404 | . |

---

**AFCIC_p1beg** — **beginning year-AFCIC p1**

---

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| label: | **C7B1B**, but label does not exist | | | | |
| range: | [**1993,2017**] | | | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **10** | | | missing .: | **379/443** |
| mean: | **2010.56** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **6.67113** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **2002** | **2007** | **2012** | **2017** | **2017** |

---

**AFCIC_p1ove** — **ending year-AFCIC p1**

---

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| label: | **C7B1C**, but label does not exist | | | | |
| range: | [**1998,2017**] | | | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **8** | | | missing .: | **419/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Value |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1998 |
| | 1 | 2002 |
| | 1 | 2006 |
| | 5 | 2007 |
| | 1 | 2011 |
| | 6 | 2012 |
| | 1 | 2015 |
| | 8 | 2017 |
| | 419 | . |

**AFCIC_p1VP** — **All China Federation of Industry and Committee-p1VP**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **FC_p1VP**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [**0**,**1**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **2** | missing .: | **0/443** |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Value |
|---|---|
| **371** | **0** |
| **72** | **1** |

**AFCIC_p2** — **All China Federation of Industry and Committee-p2**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C7B2A**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [**10**,**10**] | units: | **10** |
| unique values: | **1** | missing .: | **442/443** |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Value |
|---|---|
| **1** | **10** |
| **442** | **.** |

**AFCIC_p2beg** — **beginning year-AFCIC p2**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C7B2B**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [**2012**,**2012**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **1** | missing .: | **442/443** |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Value |
|---|---|
| **1** | **2012** |
| **442** | **.** |

**AFCIC_p2ove** — **ending year-AFCIC p2**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C7B2C**, but label does not exist | | |

```
        range:  [2017,2017]                 units:  1
unique values:  1                       missing .:  442/443

   tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                   1  2017
                 442  .
```

---

**AFCIC_p2VP** **All China Federation of Industry and Committee-p2VP**

---

```
         type:  numeric (double)
        label:  AFCIC_p2VP

        range:  [0,0]                       units:  1
unique values:  1                       missing .:  0/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                 443         0  no
```

---

**AFCIC_nation**
**Member of All China Federation of Industry and Committee at the national leve**
**> l**

---

```
         type:  numeric (double)
        label:  AFCIC_nation

        range:  [0,1]                       units:  1
unique values:  2                       missing .:  0/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                 367         0  no
                  76         1  yes
```

---

**AFCIC_n1** **Member of Finance Committee at the national level**

---

```
         type:  numeric (double)
        label:  C8B1A, but label does not exist

        range:  [9,12]                      units:  1
unique values:  4                       missing .:  399/443
```

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| tabulation: | Freq. | Value |
| | **9** | **9** |
| | **10** | **10** |
| | **7** | **11** |
| | **18** | **12** |
| | **399** | **.** |

---

**AFCIC_n1beg** — **beginning year-AFCIC n1**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C8B1B**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [**1987,2017**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **9** | missing .: | **385/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Value |
|---|---|---|
| | **1** | **1987** |
| | **1** | **1992** |
| | **3** | **1997** |
| | **10** | **2002** |
| | **1** | **2006** |
| | **11** | **2007** |
| | **11** | **2012** |
| | **1** | **2013** |
| | **19** | **2017** |
| | **385** | **.** |

---

**AFCIC_n1ove** — **ending year-AFCIC n1**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **C8B1C**, but label does not exist | | |
| range: | [**1997,2017**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **8** | missing .: | **408/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Value |
|---|---|---|
| | **1** | **1997** |
| | **1** | **2002** |
| | **2** | **2003** |
| | **1** | **2005** |
| | **7** | **2007** |
| | **10** | **2012** |
| | **1** | **2013** |
| | **12** | **2017** |
| | **408** | **.** |

---

**AFCIC_n1VP** **All China Federation of Industry and Committee-n1VP**

---

type: numeric (**double**)
label: **AFCIC_n1VP**

range: [**0,1**] units: **1**
unique values: **2** missing .: **0/443**

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **413** | **0** | no |
| | **30** | **1** | yes |

---

**rank00** **Hurun ranking in 2000**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

range: [**1,50**] units: **1**
unique values: **39** missing .: **402/443**

mean: **23.7805**
std. dev: **14.9858**

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **4** | **11** | **23** | **35** | **45** |

---

**rank01** **Hurun ranking in 2001**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

range: [**1,99**] units: **1**
unique values: **73** missing .: **362/443**

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | **42.4815** |
| std. dev: | **29.1437** |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **6** | **16** | **40** | **63** | **90** |

---

**rank02** — **Hurun ranking in 2002**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1,100**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **42** | missing .: | **348/443** |
| mean: | **44.5895** | | |
| std. dev: | **29.0563** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **6** | **19** | **42** | **71** | **89** |

---

**rank03** — **Hurun ranking in 2003**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1,100**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **30** | missing .: | **344/443** |
| mean: | **47.4141** | | |
| std. dev: | **28.2839** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **9** | **25** | **43** | **76** | **91** |

---

**rank04** — **Hurun ranking in 2004**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1,100**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **30** | missing .: | **343/443** |
| mean: | **48.74** | | |
| std. dev: | **27.3565** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **9** | **27** | **48** | **66** | **88.5** |

---

**rank05** — **Hurun ranking in 2005**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1,351**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **53** | missing .: | **245/443** |
| mean: | **120.616** | | |
| std. dev: | **92.1396** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **21** | **48** | **97** | **168** | **231** |

---

**rank06** — **Hurun ranking in 2006**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1,438**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **70** | missing .: | **215/443** |
| mean: | **153.175** | | |
| std. dev: | **120.694** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **20** | **56** | **123** | **221** | **324** |

---

**rank07** — **Hurun ranking in 2007**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1,926**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **89** | missing .: | **171/443** |
| mean: | **212.71** | | |
| std. dev: | **191.571** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **25** | **65** | **148** | **320** | **516** |

**rank08** — **Hurun ranking in 2008**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| range: | [**1,987**] | | units: | **1** | |
| unique values: | **83** | | missing .: | **159/443** | |
| mean: | **255.289** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **241.887** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **28** | **68** | **152** | **399.5** | **649** |

**rank09** — **Hurun ranking in 2009**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| range: | [**1,935**] | | units: | **1** | |
| unique values: | **87** | | missing .: | **158/443** | |
| mean: | **241.481** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **227.572** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **29** | **72** | **167** | **340** | **598** |

**rank10** — **Hurun ranking in 2010**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| range: | [**1,964**] | | units: | **1** | |
| unique values: | **92** | | missing .: | **172/443** | |
| mean: | **199.299** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **200.619** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **25** | **64** | **135** | **256** | **438** |

**rank11** — **Hurun ranking in 2011**

type: numeric (**double**)

range: [**1,900**] units: **1**
unique values: **93** missing .: **139/443**

mean: **254.339**
std. dev: **240.997**

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **31** | **70** | **167** | **379** | **662** |

---

**rank12** **Hurun ranking in 2012**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

range: [**1,988**] units: **1**
unique values: **89** missing .: **152/443**

mean: **254.351**
std. dev: **241.845**

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **29** | **73** | **151** | **377** | **628** |

---

**rank13** **Hurun ranking in 2013**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

range: [**1,945**] units: **1**
unique values: **89** missing .: **139/443**

mean: **253.48**
std. dev: **238.602**

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **32** | **72** | **165** | **372** | **635** |

---

**rank14** **Hurun ranking in 2014**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [1,975] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 84 | missing .: | 240/443 |

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | 208.591 |
| std. dev: | 241.903 |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 19 | 43 | 90 | 324 | 559 |

---

**rank15** — **Hurun ranking in 2015**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [1,1451] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 104 | missing .: | 172/443 |

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | 215.756 |
| std. dev: | 211.177 |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 25 | 65 | 145 | 305 | 525 |

---

**rank16** — **Hurun ranking in 2016**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [1,1982] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 81 | missing .: | 270/443 |

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | 286.37 |
| std. dev: | 390.298 |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 18 | 41 | 81 | 398 | 780 |

---

**rank17** — **Hurun ranking in 2017**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [1,1982] | units: | 1 |
| unique values: | 122 | missing .: | 173/443 |

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | **362.141** |
| std. dev: | **439.628** |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **27.5** | **65** | **166** | **490** | **1013** |

---

**rank18** — **Hurun ranking in 2018**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1,483**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **90** | missing .: | **215/443** |
| mean: | **159.254** | | |
| std. dev: | **125.18** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **24** | **58** | **128.5** | **243** | **354** |

---

**rankhigh** — **highest Hurun ranking**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1,99**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **96** | missing .: | **0/443** |
| mean: | **47.4853** | | |
| std. dev: | **28.7182** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **7** | **22** | **48** | **70** | **89** |

---

**ranklow** — **lowest Hurun ranking**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**2,1982**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **254** | missing .: | **0/443** |
| mean: | **476.348** | | |
| std. dev: | **390.775** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **77** | **163** | **372** | **722** | **937** |

---

**wealth00** — **Hurun capital in 2000**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**3.5,158**] | units: | **.1** |
| unique values: | **22** | missing .: | **403/443** |
| mean: | **20.0125** | | |
| std. dev: | **28.7862** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **4** | **6.5** | **10** | **19.5** | **41** |

---

**wealth01** — **Hurun capital in 2001**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**5,83**] | units: | **.1** |
| unique values: | **39** | missing .: | **364/443** |
| mean: | **19.6241** | | |
| std. dev: | **19.4792** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **5.5** | **8** | **11.5** | **21** | **55** |

---

**wealth02** — **Hurun capital in 2002**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**7,110**] | units: | **.1** |
| unique values: | **38** | missing .: | **358/443** |
| mean: | **22.1141** | | |
| std. dev: | **20.1311** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **9** | **11.9** | **13** | **24** | **47** |

**wealth03** **Hurun capital in 2003**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| range: | [**9,117**] | | units: | **.1** | |
| unique values: | **34** | | missing .: | **342/443** | |
| mean: | **22.3366** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **18.5442** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **10** | **12** | **15** | **24** | **48** |

**wealth04** **Hurun capital in 2004**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| range: | [**12.5,105**] | | units: | **.1** | |
| unique values: | **31** | | missing .: | **344/443** | |
| mean: | **24.6313** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **16.7063** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **13.5** | **15** | **19** | **28** | **45** |

**wealth05** **Hurun capital in 2005**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| range: | [**5,140**] | | units: | **.1** | |
| unique values: | **45** | | missing .: | **250/443** | |
| mean: | **22.4948** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **21.4289** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **8** | **10** | **17** | **25** | **45** |

**wealth06** **Hurun capital in 2006**

type: numeric (**double**)

range: [**8,270**] units: **.1**
unique values: **63** missing .: **218/443**

mean: **33.7022**
std. dev: **33.0766**

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **10** | **15** | **25** | **40** | **65** |

---

**wealth07** **Hurun capital in 2007**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

range: [**8,770**] units: **1**
unique values: **86** missing .: **176/443**

mean: **83.5169**
std. dev: **97.0803**

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **15** | **26** | **50** | **100** | **200** |

---

**wealth08** **Hurun capital in 2008**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

range: [**7,430**] units: **1**
unique values: **78** missing .: **164/443**

mean: **61.5842**
std. dev: **60.6176**

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **12** | **20** | **45** | **75** | **130** |

---

**wealth09** **Hurun capital in 2009**

---

type: numeric (**double**)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| range: | [**10,350**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **82** | missing .: | **163/443** |

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | **79.6107** |
| std. dev: | **73.3591** |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **18** | **29.5** | **53** | **92** | **187.5** |

---

**wealth10** — **Hurun capital in 2010**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**10,800**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **87** | missing .: | **175/443** |

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | **103.896** |
| std. dev: | **91.6857** |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **30** | **48** | **70.5** | **120** | **230** |

---

**wealth11** — **Hurun capital in 2011**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**0,700**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **94** | missing .: | **140/443** |

| | |
|---|---|
| mean: | **112.954** |
| std. dev: | **106.212** |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **29** | **45** | **80** | **130** | **255** |

---

**wealth12** — **Hurun capital in 2012**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**18,800**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **88** | missing .: | **150/443** |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| mean: | **101.962** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **97.1243** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **28** | **43** | **75** | **120** | **190** |

---

**wealth13** — **Hurun capital in 2013**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**20,1350**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **87** | missing .: | **139/443** |
| mean: | **123.546** | | |
| std. dev: | **133.599** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **32** | **50** | **90** | **140** | **235** |

---

**wealth14** — **Hurun capital in 2014**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**24,1500**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **81** | missing .: | **241/443** |
| mean: | **198.297** | | |
| std. dev: | **241.228** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **40** | **60** | **140** | **215** | **395** |

---

**wealth15** — **Hurun capital in 2015**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**26,2200**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **100** | missing .: | **173/443** |
| mean: | **226.719** | | |
| std. dev: | **230.707** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **65** | **100** | **165** | **260** | **450** |

---

**wealth16** — **Hurun capital in 2016**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**20,2150**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **85** | missing .: | **269/443** |
| mean: | **292.54** | | |
| std. dev: | **317.425** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **45** | **88** | **230** | **355** | **610** |

---

**wealth17** — **Hurun capital in 2017**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**20,2900**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **121** | missing .: | **175/443** |
| mean: | **282.709** | | |
| std. dev: | **357.035** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **42** | **80** | **180** | **330** | **575** |

---

**wealth18** — **Hurun capital in 2018**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**80,2700**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **88** | missing .: | **214/443** |
| mean: | **349.472** | | |
| std. dev: | **364.287** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **100** | **140** | **240** | **380** | **750** |

**cr_offense** — **criminal offense**

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  cr_offense

             range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
      unique values:  2                       missing .:  0/443

        tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                       419         0  no
                        24         1  yes
```

**yr_crime** — **year of crime**

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  E2a, but label does not exist

             range:  [0,2018]                     units:  1
      unique values:  2                       missing .:  21/443

        tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                       421  0
                         1  2018
                        21  .
```

**yr_verdict** — **year of verdict**

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  E2b, but label does not exist

             range:  [0,2014]                     units:  1
      unique values:  11                      missing .:  5/443

              mean:   77.8744
         std. dev:   387.98

       percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                             0         0         0         0         0
```

**type_crime** — **type of crime**

```
              type:  string (str244), but longest is str111

      unique values:  18                       missing "":  0/443

           examples:  "0"
                      "0"
                      "0"
                      "0"
```

---

**control** **control**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  control

             range:  [0,0]                        units:  1
      unique values:  1                        missing .:  21/443

        tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                       422         0  no
                        21         .
```

---

**detention** **detention**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  detention

             range:  [0,0]                        units:  1
      unique values:  1                        missing .:  10/443

        tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                       433         0  no
                        10         .
```

---

**lim_imprison** **limited term of imprisonment**

---

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  lim_imprison

             range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
      unique values:  2                        missing .:  7/443
```

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **423** | **0** | no |
| | **13** | **1** | yes |
| | **7** | **.** | |

---

**lif_imprison** — **life imprisonment**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **lif_imprison** | | |
| range: | [**0**,**1**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **2** | missing .: | **16/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **426** | **0** | no |
| | **1** | **1** | yes |
| | **16** | **.** | |

---

**postponed_death** — **postponed death sentence**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **postponed_death** | | |
| range: | [**0**,**0**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **1** | missing .: | **16/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **427** | **0** | no |
| | **16** | **.** | |

---

**death** — **death**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **death** | | |
| range: | [**0**,**1**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **2** | missing .: | **15/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **427** | **0** | no |
| | **1** | **1** | yes |
| | **15** | **.** | |

**penalty** **penalty**

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  penalty

            range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
    unique values:  2                    missing .:  18/443

       tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      416         0  no
                        9         1  yes
                       18         .
```

**Depr_PR** **deprivation of political rights**

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  Depr_PR

            range:  [0,0]                        units:  1
    unique values:  1                    missing .:  18/443

       tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      425         0  no
                       18         .
```

**confiscation** **confiscation of property**

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  confiscation

            range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
    unique values:  2                    missing .:  24/443

       tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      417         0  no
                        2         1  yes
                       24         .
```

**norm_serve** **serving normal sentence**

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  norm_serve

            range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
    unique values:  2                    missing .:  7/443

       tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      430         0  no
                        6         1  yes
                        7         .
```

---

**commuted_serve** **serving commuted sentence**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  commuted_serve

            range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
    unique values:  2                    missing .:  13/443

       tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      429         0  no
                        1         1  yes
                       13         .
```

---

**release** **released from prison**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  release

            range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
    unique values:  2                    missing .:  12/443

       tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      428         0  no
                        3         1  yes
                       12         .
```

---

**exile** **exile abroad**

---

```
             type:  numeric (double)
            label:  exile
```

```
        range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
unique values:  2                    missing .:  9/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                  433         0  no
                    1         1  yes
                    9         .
```

---

**corr_town** — **corruption official town level**

---

```
        type:  numeric (double)
       label:  corr_town

        range:  [0,0]                        units:  1
unique values:  1                    missing .:  14/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                  429         0  no
                   14         .
```

---

**corr_county** — **corruption official county level**

---

```
        type:  numeric (double)
       label:  corr_county

        range:  [0,0]                        units:  1
unique values:  1                    missing .:  14/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                  429         0  no
                   14         .
```

---

**corr_city** — **corruption official city level**

---

```
        type:  numeric (double)
       label:  E7A3, but label does not exist

        range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
unique values:  2                    missing .:  14/443
```

```
   tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                  428  0
                    1  1
                   14  .
```

---

**corr_province** — **corruption official provincial level**

---

```
           type:  numeric (double)
          label:  corr_province

          range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
  unique values:  2                    missing .:  14/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                  427         0  no
                    2         1  yes
                   14         .
```

---

**corr_nation** — **corruption official national level**

---

```
           type:  numeric (double)
          label:  corr_nation

          range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
  unique values:  2                    missing .:  14/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                  428         0  no
                    1         1  yes
                   14         .
```

---

**corr_politiburo** — **corruption official politburo level**

---

```
           type:  numeric (double)
          label:  corr_politiburo

          range:  [0,0]                        units:  1
  unique values:  1                    missing .:  10/443

   tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                  433         0  no
                   10         .
```

**yr_begin** — **beginning year of this company**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | | |
| range: | [**1967,2017**] | | units: | **1** | |
| unique values: | **42** | | missing .: | **12/443** | |
| mean: | **1994.81** | | | | |
| std. dev: | **7.33881** | | | | |
| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
| | **1986** | **1991** | **1994** | **1999** | **2004** |

**type_1st** — **category of company in the beginning**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | | |
| range: | [**1,5**] | units: | **1** | |
| unique values: | **5** | missing .: | **21/443** | |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Value |
|---|---|
| **46** | **1** |
| **40** | **2** |
| **280** | **3** |
| **49** | **4** |
| **7** | **5** |
| **21** | **.** |

**type_now** — **category of company now (2018)**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **type_now** | | |
| range: | [**1,4**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **4** | missing .: | **21/443** |

tabulation:

| Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|
| **1** | **1** | SolePropriet |
| **1** | **2** | partnership |
| **147** | **3** | Limited |
| **273** | **4** | Stock |
| **21** | **.** | |

**restructure** — **history of restructuring or privatization**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **restructure** | | |
| range: | [**0**,**1**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **2** | missing .: | **30/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **365** | **0** | no |
| | **48** | **1** | yes |
| | **30** | **.** | |

**yr_restructure** — **year of restructuring**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| range: | [**1980**,**2007**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **15** | missing .: | **401/443** |
| mean: | **1996.21** | | |
| std. dev: | **4.63042** | | |

| percentiles: | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **1992** | **1993** | **1996** | **1999** | **2001** |

**restructure_old** — **original category of company**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **restructure_old** | | |
| range: | [**1**,**4**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **4** | missing .: | **405/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **19** | **1** | State |
| | **14** | **2** | Collective |
| | **2** | **3** | Rural_or |
| | **3** | **4** | Other |
| | **405** | **.** | |

**industry** **industry**

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  industry

             range:  [1,23]                       units:  1
      unique values:  22                      missing .:  0/443

          examples:  6     ChemicalMedicalRubber
                     8     equipment
                     13    WholesaleRetail
                     16    RealEstate
```

**industry1** **main industry-1**

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  industry

             range:  [1,23]                       units:  1
      unique values:  21                      missing .:  0/443

          examples:  6     ChemicalMedicalRubber
                     8     equipment
                     13    WholesaleRetail
                     16    RealEstate
```

**industry2** **main industry-2**

```
              type:  numeric (double)
             label:  industry

             range:  [1,23]                       units:  1
      unique values:  22                      missing .:  242/443

          examples:  12    computer
                     18    ScientificTechnologicalSurvey
                     .
                     .
```

**industry3** **main industry-3**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **industry** | | |
| range: | [**2**,**23**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **21** | missing .: | **360/443** |
| examples: | . | | |
| | . | | |
| | . | | |
| | . | | |

---

**list** — **listed company**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**double**) | | |
| label: | **list** | | |
| range: | [**0**,**1**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **2** | missing .: | **2/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **116** | **0** | no |
| | **325** | **1** | yes |
| | **2** | . | |

---

**region** — **region of the company**

---

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| type: | numeric (**float**) | | |
| label: | **region** | | |
| range: | [**1**,**4**] | units: | **1** |
| unique values: | **4** | missing .: | **1/443** |

| tabulation: | Freq. | Numeric | Label |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **56** | **1** | west |
| | **27** | **2** | middle |
| | **20** | **3** | northeast |
| | **339** | **4** | east |
| | **1** | . | |

---

**hometown** — **region of hometown**

---

```
            type:  numeric (float)
           label:  hometown

           range:  [1,4]                        units:  1
  unique values:  4                          missing .:  3/443

      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                      53         1  west
                      57         2  middle
                      33         3  northeast
                     297         4  east
                       3         .
```

---

**sector_father** — **father's danwei**

---

```
            type:  numeric (float)
           label:  job

           range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
  unique values:  2                          missing .:  0/443

      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                     348         0  market
                      95         1  state
```

---

**sectorlast** — **last danwei before self-employed**

---

```
            type:  numeric (float)
           label:  job

           range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
  unique values:  2                          missing .:  45/443

      tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                     208         0  market
                     190         1  state
                      45         .
```

# Chapter 3

# Appendix I: Original Survey Form in Chinese

This chapter attaches the original survey used in the actual implementation for the data collection process. It provides the questionaire given to research assistants for compiling relevant variables in the codebook.

N1□□□□□□

（企业总部所在地邮政编码）

N2：□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

(序号/企业注册号（15-18 位））

# 富 豪 榜 企 业 主 调 查 表

**S1 富豪名：_____**

**S2 上榜企业名称：_____**

2011 年 6 月第一版

2018 年 6 月第二版

中 国 社 会 科 学 院
中 国 人 民 大 学 **榜单富豪综合状况调查课题组**
浙 江 大 学

# A 部分：个人及家庭成员基本情况

A1. **性别：** （1）男 □ （2）女 □

A2. **民族：** (1)汉 □ (2)少数民族 □

A3. **a 出生年份：** [_____|_____|_____|_____] 年
**b 死亡年份：** [_____|_____|_____|_____] 年

A4. **出生所在地是** _____省（A4a）_____市(A4b)【直辖市在省市两栏均填上】
**【省市不要填汉字，按编码表填写数字】**

**A5. 教育状况**

**A5a.最高文化程度（全日制）是：**

（1）初中及以下 ○ （2）高中/职高/中专/技校 ○ （3）大专 ○
（4）本科(含双学士) ○ （5）硕士 ○ （6）博士 ○

**A5b1.是否接受过高等教育（含大专）：** （1）是 □ （2）否 □
**A5b2.大学或大专的名字是：** _____
**A5b3.上大学/大专的年份：** _____
**A5b4.高等教育是否就读于：**

（1）境外著名高校* ○ （2）其他境外高校 ○
（3）军事院校 ○ （4）国内重点大学（985/211 高校）○
（5）国内普通大学（含大专） ○

*指 QS 或 US NEWS 世界大学综合排名 300 以内高校

**A5b5.最高学历所学专业（请根据专业编码直接填写相应编码）** _____

01. 综合或不分专业
02. 理科（数、理、化、天、地、生）
03. 生物工程
04. 计算机应用、软件
05. 其他工科
06. 医学、药学
07. 农林牧渔
08. 财政金融
09. 经济学
10. 管理科学
11. 服务专业
12. 法律
13. 人口、社会、政治学
14. 马列科社、文史哲
15. 外语
16. 教育、心理图书情报
17. 军事学

**A5c1 是否有海外学习经历：** （1）是 □ （2）否 □

**A5c2. 是否有海外工作经历：** （1）是 □ （2）否 □

**A6. 父亲的信息**

**A6a 父亲的政治面貌：**

（1）共产党 （2）民主党派 （3）群众 （4）国民党 （5） 不清楚

**A6b父亲的教育程度:**

（1）初中及以下 ○ （2）高中/职高/中专/技校 ○ （3）大专 ○

（4）本科(含双学士) ○ （5）硕士 ○ （6）博士 ○

**A6c父亲的职业**

| a 职业 | b 单位性质 |
|---|---|
| (1) 党政官员<br>(2) 军官或情报系统官员<br>(3) 国有企业的高管（董事长、总经理、厂长等）<br>(4) 国有企业的中低层管理人员<br>(5) 国有企业的工人<br>(6) 他人所有的私营企业的老总、高管<br>(7) 他人所有的私营企业的中层管理人员<br>(8) 他人所有的私营企业的雇员<br>(9) 外资或境外企业的老总、高管<br>(10) 外资或境外企业的中低层管理人员<br>(11) 外资或境外企业的雇员<br>(12) 为自己家族企业工作<br>(13) 专业技术人员（医生、教师、科学家等）<br>(14) 村干部（村长、村支书、小队长等）或农村集体经济负责人<br>(15) 个体户或自雇者<br>(16) 学生（含肄业）<br>(17) 普通农民<br>(18) 城镇集体企业的负责人<br>(19) 无业<br>(20) 其他 | (1) 党政军群组织<br>(2) 事业单位（学校、医院、研究机构等）<br>(3) 国有企业<br>(4) 城镇集体企业<br>(5) 农村基层组织（村委会、大队、小队）和农村集体企业<br>(6) 农民<br>(7) 自己家族的企业<br>(8) 他人所有的私营企业<br>(9) 外资企业或境外机构<br>(10) 个体工商户<br>(11) 学校（应届毕业生、肄业生）<br>(12) 其他 |
| \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| |

*国有企业含全民所有制企业、国有控股

# B 部分：职业经历

**B1.哪一年第一次参加工作/通过劳动获取报酬？** **年**

*包括：在创业之前的打工、正式工作（比如体制内的工作）等。

**B2.哪一年开始从事私营经济活动的（创业年份）？** **年**

*包括：以实际控制者身份（含承包人）运作现有公司或其前身公司（一般是“戴红帽子”的集体企业或国有企业，但企业主当时必须为企业实际控制者）

**B3.先驱还是后来者（1992年之前或之后创业）**（1）先驱 □ （2）后来者 □

**B4 在开始从事私营经济活动/创业前最后一份工作的情况：**

| a 职业 | b 单位性质 |
|---|---|
| (21) 党政官员<br>(22) 军官或情报系统官员<br>(23) 国有企业的高管（董事长、总经理、厂长等）<br>(24) 国有企业的中低层管理人员<br>(25) 国有企业的工人<br>(26) 他人所有的私营企业的老总、高管<br>(27) 他人所有的私营企业的中层管理人员<br>(28) 他人所有的私营企业的雇员<br>(29) 外资或境外企业的老总、高管<br>(30) 外资或境外企业的中低层管理人员<br>(31) 外资或境外企业的雇员<br>(32) 为自己家族企业工作<br>(33) 专业技术人员（医生、教师、科学家等）<br>(34) 村干部（村长、村支书、小队长等）或农村集体经济负责人<br>(35) 个体户或自雇者<br>(36) 学生（含肄业）<br>(37) 普通农民<br>(38) 城镇集体企业的负责人<br>(39) 无业<br>(40) 其他 | (13) 党政军群组织<br>(14) 事业单位（学校、医院、研究机构等）<br>(15) 国有企业<br>(16) 城镇集体企业<br>(17) 农村基层组织（村委会、大队、小队）和农村集体企业<br>(18) 农民<br>(19) 自己家族的企业<br>(20) 他人所有的私营企业<br>(21) 外资企业或境外机构<br>(22) 个体工商户<br>(23) 学校（应届毕业生、肄业生）<br>(24) 其他 |
| \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| |

*国有企业含全民所有制企业、国有控股

**B5A 综合全部职业生涯，是否在体制内工作过的经历**

（1）否 □ （2）是 □ （3）不清楚 □

**B5B 在从事私营经济活动前的最高行政级别（均含副职）：**

(1) 一般干部（无级别，含村、大队主要干部） □

(2) 科员及股级干部 □

(3) 科级干部（含乡镇负责人、连级或营级军官） □

(4) 县处级干部（含团级军官） □

(5) 厅局级干部（含旅级、师级军官） □

(6) 部级干部（含军级军官） □

(7) 党和国家领导人 □

# C 部分：政治参与情况

C1. A.目前的政治面貌是：(单选)

（1）共产党员.....☐

（2）民主党派成员.....☐

（3）群众.....☐

B.是哪年加入_[C1a的答案]的？[_____|_____|_____|_____] 年

C2. a.是否担任或曾任省级人大代表：（1）是 ☐ （2）否 ☐

B.担任的届别数：

| | a 届别 | b 开始年 | C 终止年 | D 是否担任常委或以上职务 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 2 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 3 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 4 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |

*此栏如不够自行添加

C3. a.是否担任或曾任全国人大代表：（1）是 ☐ （2）否 ☐

B.担任的届别数：

| | a 届别 | b 开始年 | C 终止年 | D 是否担任常委或以上职务 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 2 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 3 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 4 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |

*此栏如不够自行添加

C4. a.是否担任或曾任省级政协委员：（1）是 ☐ （2）否 ☐

B.担任的届别数：

| | a 届别 | b 开始年 | C 终止年 | D 是否担任常委或以上职务 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 2 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 3 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 4 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |

*此栏如不够自行添加

C5. a.是否担任或曾任全国政协委员：（1）是 ☐ （2）否 ☐

B.担任的届别数：

| | a 届别 | b 开始年 | C 终止年 | D 是否担任常委或以上职务 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 2 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 4 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |

*此栏如不够自行添加

**C6. a.是否担任或曾任全国党代会党代表：**（1）是 ☐ （2）否 ☐

**B.担任的届别数：**

| | a 届别 | b 开始年 | C 终止年 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 |
| 2 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 |
| 3 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 |
| 4 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 |

*此栏如不够自行添加

**C7. a.是否担任或曾任省级工商联执委或以上职务：**（1）是 ☐ （2）否 ☐

**B.担任的届别数：**

| | a 届别 | b 开始年 | C 终止年 | D 是否担任副主席或以上职务 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 2 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 3 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 4 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |

*此栏如不够自行添加

**C8. a.是否担任或曾任全国工商联执委或以上职务：**（1）是 ☐ （2）否 ☐

**B.担任的届别数：**

| | a 届别 | b 开始年 | C 终止年 | D 是否担任副主席或以上职务 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 2 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 3 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |
| 4 | 第___\|___\|届 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | ___\|___\|___\|___\|年 | 是 ☐ |

*此栏如不够自行添加。中华全国总商会的职务等同于全国工商联职务处理。

# D 部分：榜单情况

**D1. 在胡润排行榜的情况**

| 年份 | a 排名 | b 财富额（亿元） |
|---|---|---|
| **0.**2000 | | |
| **1.**2001 | | |
| **2.**2002 | | |
| **3.**2003 | | |
| **4.**2004 | | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **5.**2005 | | |
| **6.**2006 | | |
| **7.**2007 | | |
| **8.**2008 | | |
| **9.**2009 | | |
| **10.**2010 | | |
| **11.**2011 | | |
| **12.**2012 | | |
| **13.**2013 | | |
| **14.**2014 | | |
| **15.**2015 | | |
| **16.**2016 | | |
| **17.**2017 | | |

***2003 年之前的《福布斯》排行榜视为《胡润榜》。**

**D2. 迄今在胡润榜上的最高排名 _____**

**D3. 迄今在胡润榜上的最低排名 _____**

## E 部分：越轨部分

E1. **是否被刑事处罚过？** （1）是 ☐ （2）否 ☐

（刑事处罚有主刑和附加刑两种。主刑有：管制、拘役、有期徒刑、无期徒刑和死刑。附加刑有：罚金、剥夺政治权利和没收财产）

**如果是，填答下面的问题。如果不是，跳到 F 部分。**

**E2. 如果是，最近一次是在**

**a_____年“落马”的。（指被纪检监察、检察等其他机关宣布处罚）**

**b_____年被法院宣判的（终审判决）。**

**E3. 终审判决的罪名是 _____**（罪名编码表《最新刑法罪名大全》）

**E4. 主刑判处结果：**

（1）管制 ☐

（2）拘役 ☐

（3）有期徒刑 ☐

（4）无期徒刑 ☐

（5）死刑（缓期执行） ☐

（6）死刑（立即执行） ☐

（7）尚未宣判 ☐

**E5. 是否有以下附加刑（可多选）：**

（1）罚金 ☐

（2）剥夺政治权利 ☐

（3）没收财产 ☐

**E6. 现在处境：**

（1）正常服刑/处决 □

（2）减刑 □

（3）出狱 □

（4）境外流亡 □

**E7. 是否有下列级别的党政官员涉案？（多选）**

（1）乡镇（街道）级 □

（2）县（市）级 □

（3）地市 □

（4）省级 □

（5）国家级 □

（6）政治局级及以上 □

# F 部分：企业经营情况

**F1. 上榜的这家企业是在哪一年登记注册的？** [_____|_____|_____|_____] **年**

**F2. a 企业成立时注册的类型是：**

（1）独资企业 □ （2）合伙企业 □ （3）有限责任公司 □

（4）股份有限公司 □ （5）一人公司 □

**b 企业目前注册的类型是：**

（1）独资企业 □ （2）合伙企业 □ （3）有限责任公司 □

（4）股份有限公司 □ （5）一人公司 □

**F3. a. 企业是不是收购、改制过来的？**

（1）是 □ （2）不是 □

**如果是，**

**b. 是在哪一年改制、收购的？**[_____|_____|_____|_____] 年

**c 原来是哪类企业?**

（1）国有企业 □ （2）城镇集体企业 □

（3）农村集体企业 □ （4）私营企业 □

**F4. A 创业所属的行业类型：_____**

**B1 目前公司主营业务所属行业一_____**

**B2 目前公司主营业务所属行业二_____**

**B3 目前公司主营业务所属行业三_____**

*行业编码如下（参照《国民经济行业分类代码表》的“大类”）

1"农林牧副渔"

2"采矿业"

3"食品烟草制造业"

4 "纺织服装制造业"
5 "木材家具造纸印刷制造业"
6 "化学医药橡胶塑料制造业"
7 "金属制造业"
8 "装备制造业"
9 "电气燃气水供应"
10 "建筑业"
11 "交通仓储邮政业"
12 "信息传输、计算机服务和软件业"
13 "批发和零售业"
14 "住宿和餐饮业"
15 "金融业"
16 "房地产业"
17 "租赁和商务服务业"
18 "科学研究、技术服务和地质勘查业"
19 "水利、环境和公共设施管理业"
20 "居民服务和其他服务业"
21 "教育"
22 "卫生、社会保障和社会福利业"
23 "文化、体育和娱乐业"
24 "公共管理和社会组织"
25 "国际组织".

**F5. 是否有企业上市？**

根据国泰安数据进行匹配

# G 部分：企业社会责任

**根据国泰安数据和基金会中心网数据进行合并**

# Chapter 4

# Appendix II: Two Peer-Reviewed Papers for Citation Purpose

In this chapter, we attach two peer-reviewed paper as a way to cite our CSRP dataset.

The first part of the chapter attaches an English peer-reviewed paper based on an older version (i.e., 2012 version) of the data, written by one of the coauthors in this project. The paper, with a title "The Horatio Alger Myth in China: Origins of the First Generation of Visibly Richest Chinese Private Entrepreneurs", was published in *China: An International Journal*, May 2017.

The second paper by our coauthors of dataset is published in a leading Chinese journal, *Social Sciences in China*, titled as "The Social Composition of China's Private Entrepreneurs: Class and Cohort Difference".

It is important to note the relationship of their usage of the data with our codebook. The first paper was written on the basis of an older version of CSRP. The second paper was based on another ongoing survey of private enterprise, CPES.

# The Horatio Alger Myth in China: Origins of the First Generation of Visibly Richest Chinese Private Entrepreneurs

LU Peng

*This article traces the socio-economic origins of the first generation of the visibly richest private entrepreneurs in China by analysing the roles of political background, family connections and culture capital. Based on a data set essentially reconstructed from two leading Chinese rich lists from 2003 to 2012, the author finds no clear evidence to support the hypothesis of "strong political capitalism". The theory of "interrupted embourgeoisement" is applicable to those who come from pre-communist elite or petty-bourgeois families, but more than half of the rich founders were born into the lower-middle class, such as the urban working class or peasantry. Moreover, for those who majored in social sciences and humanities, having a college degree is considered a ticket for landing a job in a public institute early in their career, while those having credentials in sciences and engineering are more likely to start their business in relevant areas directly. The author concludes that although each factor is vital, none of these provides a satisfactory single explanation for individual super-wealth. There is also a significant distinction between pioneers (early adopters) and newcomers (the recently established entrepreneurs).*

## INTRODUCTION: THE HORATIO ALGER MYTH

Over three decades of economic growth in China have seen the emergence of a substantial "new economic elite". In *Forbes* 2010 global rich list, China was ranked second, only behind the United States. Public opinion is clearly divided over the phenomenon of the new rich. Some see the nouveaux riches as products of crony capitalism; others credit their success to the very spirit of capitalism, entailing values such as hard work and thrift. Systematic research on the extremely wealthy is still lacking, although there is already considerable research on the more ordinary rich new

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economic elites in China.[1] The social origin of the super-rich therefore still remains obscure. The evidence from a study of the visibly wealthiest entrepreneurs, a term to be discussed in detail below, is that their careers, motivations and progress have been mixed. The ingredients of their success may include happenstance in addition to rags to riches stories, the use of political connections, and family histories of wealth and business development.

Universally, the very wealthy often describe their self-made success stories as similar to the rags to riches stories made popular by Horatio Alger in the United States during the mid to late 19th century. However, many scholars, especially historians and sociologists, have written outstanding work revealing some of the more complicated realities behind these stories.[2] Yet the emergence of Chinese new economic elites presents something empirically and theoretically new. On the empirical side, these richest Chinese private entrepreneurs emerged from a state-socialist economy system that had barely any private property. Theoretically, it echoes an intriguing question posed by Iván Szélényi and his colleagues in their call for a "neo-classical sociology"—i.e. studies of the origins and formations of a capitalist or entrepreneurial class under post-communism that provide unique clues to the making of capitalism.[3] Essentially, there are three or four possible explanations of the ways in which a new bourgeoisie might be generated through reliance on political, human or social capital. This article examines the likelihood of each and their interactions.

The origin of private entrepreneurs in today's China is most often attributed to political connections that came with state socialism. There are in fact two versions of "political capitalism theory", depending on whether political capital can be directly converted into economic capital. The "weak" version insists that holders of political capital are the major beneficiaries of market transition, through various indirect

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[1] Chen Minglu, *Tiger Girls: Women and Enterprises in the People's Republic of China* (London: Routledge, 2011); Bruce Dickson, *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); David Goodman, *The New Rich in China: Future Rulers, Present Lives* (London: Routledge, 2008); Scott Kennedy, *The Business of Lobbying in China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Margaret Pearson, *China's New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1997); Kellee Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); and David Wank, *Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[2] Michael Allen, *The Founding Fortunes: A New Anatomy of the Super-Rich Families in America* (New York: Truman Talley Books, 1987); Victor Bornet, "Those 'Robber Barons'", *The Western Political Quarterly* 2, no. 6 (1953): 342–6; Hal Bridges, "The Robber Baron Concept in American History", *The Business History Review* 32, no. 1 (1958): 1–13; William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?: Power and Politics, and Social Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006); Matthew Josephson, *The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1861–1901* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962); and William Miller, "American Historians and the Business Elite", *The Journal of Economic History* 9, no. 2 (1949): 184–208.

[3] Gil Eyal, Iván Szélényi and Eleanor Townsley, "The Utopia of Postsocialist Theory and the Ironic View of History in Neoclassical Sociology", *American Journal of Sociology* 106, no. 4 (2001): 1121–8.

mechanisms like rent-seeking and patronage.[4] The "strong" version argues that Party-state officials and managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) convert themselves from political elites to economic elites directly through "mass privatisation" or "management buyouts". This theory was quite popular in the late 1980s and early 1990s when market economies were just emerging in former state-socialist countries.[5] There are however problems with both explanations. Victor Nee, in particular, has argued that market transition has not led to former political elites turning their rent-seeking behaviour to advantage but that the major beneficiaries have been the direct (capitalist) producers.[6] Others have argued that political capital works to promote the enrichment of clients, to transform political capital into social or networking capital, and to connect the old to the new to post- and anti-communist political elites rather than to the simple transformation of political to economic elites.[7]

A second possible origin of the new bourgeoisie is human capital. Those with educational qualifications, backgrounds of management experience, especially in the state sector, foreign-language skills and an entrepreneurial or capitalist spirit are assumed to more likely become the new economic elite during the transition to the market from a state socialist system. Szélényi and his colleagues found that in Hungary and Poland, most of the wealthiest entrepreneurial capitalists in the mid 1990s were people who had already held managerial, sub-managerial and/or technocratic positions in SOEs during the socialist rule.[8] In China, there are already those who have observed the similar self-transformative role of education.[9]

A third possible origin of the new bourgeoisie is the role of family and intergenerational influences and support. Family traditions and narratives, marriage, financial support from relatives overseas, and even "habitus" rooted in their business "gene" are possible important factors. Szélényi's study of Hungarian peasant entrepreneurs during the 1980s highlighted the idea of "interrupted embourgeoisement"—it was

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[4] Bian Yanjie, "Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility", *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 91–116; Andrew G. Walder, "Income Determination and Market Opportunity in Rural China, 1978–1996", *Journal of Comparative Economics* 30, no. 2 (2002): 354–75; Andrew G. Walder, "Elite Opportunity in Transitional Economies", *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 6 (2003): 899–916; and Wank, *Commodifying Communism*.

[5] Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzej Rapaczynski. "Capitalism with a Comrade's Face", *Transition* 2, no. 2 (1996): 5–11; Elemér Hankiss, *East European Alternatives* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); and Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of Breakthrough* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991).

[6] Victor Nee and Robert Matthews, "Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism", *Annual Review of Sociology* 22 (1996): 401–35; Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, "On Politicized Capitalism", in *On Capitalism*, ed. V. Nee and R. Swedberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[7] Gil Eyal, Iván Szélényi and Eleanor Townsley, *Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe* (London: Verso, 1998).

[8] Eyal, Szélényi and Townsley, *Making Capitalism without Capitalists*.

[9] Li Lulu, "Institutional Transition and Change of Stratification Structure", *Social Sciences in China*, no. 6 (2002): 105–18.

families, who had been entrepreneurs before the establishment of the socialist economy and communist party rule, who were at the forefront of entrepreneurial capitalist activities after several decades despite not having been involved in business in the interim.[10] In China, it is widely believed that the earliest ventures in private business after 1978 were made by those who had lost everything in the previous decade during the Cultural Revolution. But there is also evidence that suggests the high possibility that the new economic elites had parents in the Party-state and grandparents in the pre-1949 ruling class, thus linking the importance of family narratives to individual behaviour.[11]

These three possible origin explanation are of course not exclusive, but the objective of the exercise is to understand how these factors interact at the point when the super-rich began to build their businesses. Timing is regarded as crucial in the development of state socialist economies undergoing market transition.[12] In this case, the transformation of China's economy can be divided into two major periods. The first period started in 1979 and ended in 1989. During this era, the Party-state launched its "reform and opening up" and encouraged market-oriented policies in the rural and, later, urban areas, although most SOEs were not yet thoroughly reformed. The second period began in 1992 when the central government launched its nationwide "state-owned enterprises reform", a campaign aimed essentially at privatising small state or collectively owned enterprises. This reform was so radical in some aspects that some economists labelled it as a "mini-bang".[13] A clear distinction is discerned between pioneers (who started before 1989) and newcomers (who only became entrepreneurially active after 1992) upon examining the super-rich.

## IDENTIFYING THE SUPER-RICH

This study identifies the super-rich by using two major annual lists of China's wealthiest business elite: the *Hurun Rich List* and its competitor, the *Forbes Rich List.* As *Hurun* and *Forbes* started to publish their Chinese rich lists separately in 2003,[14] that year is

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[10] Iván Szélényi, *Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

[11] Chen, *Tiger Girls*; David Goodman, "New Economic Elites: The Social Basis of Local Power", *China Studies*, no. 16 (2013).

[12] Ákos Róna-Tas, "The First Shall Be Last? Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism", *American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 1 (1994): 40–69; Iván Szélényi and Eric Kostello, "The Market Transition Debate: Toward a Synthesis?", *The American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 4 (1996): 1082–96.

[13] Lin Nan, "Local Market Socialism: Local Corporatism in Action in Rural China", *Theory and Society* 24, no.3 (1995): 301–54.

[14] *Hurun* is the Chinese name of Rupert Hoogewerf (born 1970), a British and former chartered accountant, who is the publisher of the *Hurun Rich List*. Hoogewerf published his first China rich list in 1999 as an independent researcher by selling it to *Forbes* magazine. From then on, Forbes bought and published Hoogewerf's rich list in the name of *Forbes Rich List* until 2003, when their business relationship broke down. After 2003, *Hurun* started to release his own list.

a convenient base date or year for identifying members of the visibly richest Chinese corporate elite. Many researchers and commentators have questioned the reliability of these rich lists as a source for social-science analysis, although works based on rich lists or similar materials have been regularly published by journals and the press.[15] Clearly these lists are neither comprehensive nor even necessarily accurate. The objective of this project is neither to test the credibility of the rich lists nor to tell stories about rich individuals. It does not, for example, depend on potentially dubious information such as the amount of wealth or an individuals' annual ranking. Rather, the rich lists merely provide this exercise with an index or "census" of names of the "*visibly richest Chinese private entrepreneurs*". Two hundred and eleven Chinese entrepreneurs were listed in the top 50 of either *Hurun* or *Forbes* from 2003 to 2012.

Identifying names on the list is easy but *Hurun* and *Forbes* provide only limited information about the people and their backgrounds. As these super-rich are unlikely to grant face-to-face or telephone interviews, further information, including demographic characteristics, educational experience, professional mobility, family members, political status and details of their enterprise(s) have to be sought and collated from available sources, such as published autobiographies and biographies, journal articles, magazine and newspaper reports, online materials, as well as fragments from blogs, Weibo and other social media.

The list of 211 Chinese entrepreneurs can be classified into two categories: individual entrepreneurs and enterprise groups. The latter category includes 19 husband-and-wife couples, four pairs of fathers and sons, four brothers, a mother-and-daughter pair, and a father-and-daughter pair, as well as 16 groups that can be labelled as "somebody's family". This is a distinctive characteristic of Chinese rich lists vis-à-vis their counterparts in Russia, Hungary and Poland that reflects flourishing family enterprises and their complicated property rights. For creators of rich lists in China, it is challenging to identify the value of wealth with accuracy or the actual role of a certain member in a family business. For example, some enterprises were co-founded by siblings or husband-and-wife or father-and-son teams; these family-member teams are assumed to share similar patterns—equal contribution to their family empire. In such cases, names of co-founders are shown jointly on the rich list as an enterprise group rather than as individual entrepreneurs.

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[15] Shamus Rahman Khan, "The Sociology of Elites", *Annual Review of Sociology* 38 (2012): 361–77; Sidney Ratner, *New Light on the History of Great American Fortunes: American Millionaires of 1892 and 1902* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Inc., 1953); Richard Zweigenhaft and William Domhoff, *The New CEOs: Women, African American, Latino, and Asian American Leaders of Fortune 500 Companies* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Ye Qing, Li Zengquan and Li Guangqing, "Fuhao bang hui yingxiang qiye kuaiji xinxi zhiliang ma?" (Will the Rich List Influence the Companies' Quality of Financial Information), *Guanli shijie* (*Management World*), no. 1 (2012): 104–120.

On the other hand, not every co-founder of a family enterprise will have his or her name appear together on the rich lists. In fact, in some family enterprises co-founded by father and son, only the son's name is listed because the father could have retired (e.g. Dai Hao 戴浩). Also, cases where siblings' names are listed separately indicate they have clearly different business interests and (largely) independent wealth—which is usually the result of an agreed division of a family business or development of a new enterprise. Conversely, there are also cases of entrepreneurs whose names are listed individually but their enterprises are family run. It is also noteworthy that in the rich lists, the first co-founder name of an enterprise group should normally be taken as the most important person in the company.

**TABLE 1**
**China's Super-Rich: Demography**

| | | Pioneer | | Newcomer | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | Male | 140 | 95.2% | 59 | 93.7% | 199 | 94.8% |
| | Female | 7 | 4.8% | 4 | 6.3% | 11 | 5.2% |
| Cohort | 1940s | 20 | 13.7% | 2 | 3.2% | 22 | 10.5% |
| | 1950s | 67 | 45.9% | 14 | 22.2% | 81 | 38.8% |
| | 1960s | 54 | 37.0% | 35 | 55.6% | 89 | 42.6% |
| | 1970s | 5 | 3.4% | 12 | 19.0% | 17 | 8.1% |
| Mean of age in 2013 | | 56 | | 50 | | 54 | |
| Mean of age when business inaugurated | | 29 | | 32 | | 30 | |

*Source*: The author's computation.

Table 1 presents the basic demographic information of these 211 entrepreneurs. They were predominantly male and their average age in 2013 was 53 years old. None of them was born later than the 1980s, although some of their children had already started work in the leadership of the companies they started. These super-rich started their businesses at a relatively young age—29 years old on average for the pioneers and 32 on average for the newcomers. Studying the names of the first (or the most important) person listed in the listing of enterprise groups, it is noted that female entrepreneurs were generally under-represented.

**TABLE 2**
**China's Super-Rich: Gender**

| | Number of united entrepreneur groups | Percentage (%) | Number of split entrepreneur groups | Percentage (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Male | 200 | 94.8 | 200 | 86.6 |
| Female | 11 | 5.2 | 31 | 13.4 |
| Total | 211 | 100.0 | 231 | 100.0 |

This is evident in the composition of entrepreneurs in terms of gender (Table 2)—there were only 11 female entrepreneurs, accounting for 5.2 per cent of the 211 entrepreneurs. However, if females in the husband-and-wife and mother-daughter teams are taken into consideration, there were 10 more female entrepreneurs added to the entrepreneur foray, accounting for 13.4 per cent of the (new) total.

## POLITICAL CAPITAL: TAKING THE PLUNGE

Political capital, in simple terminology, is defined as the political resources attached to an official's political post. This therefore requires identifying entrepreneurs who had been officials before starting their business. The vast majority of officials were Party members. As the author could not find or collect information through public sources on whether a super-rich was a Party member, he assumed that they were if they were officials. Entrepreneurs' membership of either the People's Congress or the People's Political Consultative Conference was not used as political capital in this article, because these were usually seen as rewards/results for their business success. Hence, this article aims to discuss the role/contribution of political capital in their success in the very early stages, especially the pre-business era.

Data were collected on the last immediate occupation of each member of the super-rich before they established the enterprises that made them so successful (Table 3). First, an attempt was made to establish where they had been working, i.e. the workplace. There are essentially nine possibilities: (i) Party-state organs, including military and mass organisations like the women's union and labour union; (ii) state-owned or state-controlled enterprises; (iii) public institutions, such as schools and hospitals; (iv) collective sector enterprises; (v) foreign companies; (vi) the founder's own family enterprise(s); (vii) other private institutions, including private schools, hospitals and non-governmental organisations; (viii) self-employed; or (ix) in education. The first three categories—Party-state organs, SOEs and public institutions—represent the state system and hence, occupations within which are regarded as "inside the system" (*tizhinei*). Conditions of employment are different in the state system, not least because employment is more secure and more politicised.

The numbers of super-rich who previously worked in Party-state organs, SOEs and public institutions were 26, 42 and 24, respectively, and this altogether (i.e. the state system) constituted 43.6 per cent of the total (Table 3). The other six categories accounted for 56.4 per cent of the total, with 32 in collective sector enterprises; nine in foreign institutions; four in family companies; 12 in other private institutions; 50 were self-employed; and six were students or recent graduates. Although collective sector enterprises are now generally considered part of the public sector, this article classified them as outside the system because they faced much greater market competition in the wake of market transformations, and many of them were actually contracted out to independent businesspersons.

**TABLE 3**
**China's Super-Rich: Last Occupation Immediately before Establishing Their Enterprise**

| Last position before entering business in: | Super Rich Entrepreneur | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Pioneer | Newcomer | |
| Party-state-military organ | 17 | 9 | 26 |
| | 11.8% | 14.8% | 12.7% |
| SOEs | 24 | 18 | 42 |
| | 16.7% | 29.5% | 20.5% |

| Last position before entering business in: | Super Rich Entrepreneur | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Pioneer | Newcomer | |
| Public institutions (e.g. schools, research institutes and hospitals) | 16 | 8 | 24 |
| | 11.1% | 13.1% | 11.7% |
| Collective enterprises | 28 | 4 | 32 |
| | 19.4% | 6.6% | 15.6% |
| Foreign institutions | 2 | 7 | 9 |
| | 1.4% | 11.5% | 4.4% |
| Family enterprises | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| | 1.4% | 3.3% | 2.0% |
| Other private institutions | 6 | 6 | 12 |
| | 4.2% | 9.8% | 5.9% |
| Self-employed | 45 | 5 | 50 |
| | 31.3% | 8.2% | 24.4% |
| In Education | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| | 2.8% | 3.3% | 2.9% |
| Total | 144 | 61 | 205 |
| | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

There was a marked difference between pioneers and newcomers. For pioneers, the number of people who quit their jobs inside the system, or took the plunge and "jumped into the sea" (*xia hai)*, and went to work in the private sector was 57, accounting for 39.6 per cent of the pioneers. On the other hand, as far as newcomers are concerned, the number of people who quit their jobs inside the system was 35, and this percentage increased considerably to 57.4 per cent of the newcomers. The significant increase in the rate of "jumping into the sea" from 16.7 per cent to 29.5 per cent is clearly related to the apparent flood of resignations in the SOEs after 1992.

For those super-rich who quit their jobs in foreign institutions in order to establish new businesses, the percentage of newcomers (11.5 per cent) was significantly higher than the percentage of pioneers (1.4 per cent). There was a significantly higher percentage of pioneers (19.4 per cent) than newcomers (6.6 per cent) who quit their positions in collective sector enterprises before establishing their new businesses. There was also a much higher percentage of pioneers (31.3 per cent) compared to newcomers (8.2 per cent) who quit their self-employment status to establish their new businesses. These disparities reveal an environmental change in Chinese private economy after 1992 when more people from relatively more privileged institutions, including the Party-state and foreign institutions, were willing to start businesses in the private sector later rather than earlier.

All the same, the real number of these super-rich who quit their jobs in the Party-state system might be slightly underestimated since this study considers only the last immediate position held before they established new enterprises (Table 3). Some of these super-rich founders preferred to step out of the system more cautiously by working for other private employers for a while, even in a senior management position, before inaugurating their own businesses.

The author further analysed the professions and occupations of these super-rich before they established their new enterprises. By simple observation, people who worked for the Party-state organs all had the status of "cadres". Other former employees "inside the system", however, had mixed identities. For example, 42 people worked in SOEs, but only 24 (57.1 per cent) were in management. Of the remaining 43.9 per cent, 14 were white-collar workers and four were blue-collar workers. Moreover, few of the former SOE managers privatised their former enterprises directly; instead, they quit their jobs and started entirely afresh. Some of them later acquired other SOEs during expansion, but that would involve a completely different research approach for a future study.

Among the super-rich who worked for public institutions, 22 out of the 24 were professionals, such as teachers and doctors. Only one, Liang Xinjun, had the status of cadre. He was working for the Communist Youth League at his alma mater, Fudan University from 1991 to 1992. Although his post was unknown, it is unlikely that he held a high position as he was merely a recent graduate at the time. There are currently six super-rich entrepreneurs who had started their businesses directly as students or fresh graduates.

Three-quarters of the super-rich founders of enterprises, who had their origins in the collective sector, had been the heads of their entities in their earlier careers. They started to build their empire by contracting with grass-roots collective small businesses, usually village and town enterprises, from local governments based on various forms of profit-sharing systems. Only a few of them had ever been ordinary workers or peasants: together with 54 self-employed and nine ordinary workers, constituting roughly 30 per cent of the total.

## HUMAN CAPITAL: IS KNOWLEDGE MONEY?

There have been many comments recently in the People's Republic of China that some rich people and indeed some leading cadres had acquired a Master's degree and even a PhD via certain avenues. The rich were essentially criticised for buying their degree. Particularly, professional degrees like MBAs and EMBAs are widely regarded as a vehicle for networking rather than an education. For analysis of educational level in this study, the author focused on full-time schooling in skills and knowledge acquisition. The author set out this prerequisite: the super-rich are deemed to qualify at a given education level if they had attended classes and written their coursework by themselves and not by their assistants. By this definition and condition, all kinds of part-time education, including on-the-job graduate training, exchange visits, refresher courses, correspondence courses and evening schools, have been excluded in this study. Full-time education in private (*minban*) colleges or universities is treated with similar consideration as education in a public university, provided the degree is recognised by the government. The author did not take into account the credentials of students who dropped out of their study. For students who dropped out from graduate school, their

credentials would be entered as having completed their undergraduate course with a bachelor's degree.

Of course, there are vast educational differences between various institutions at the same level of the educational hierarchy. It was therefore necessary, for example, to differentiate a category of "elite universities", which refers to the PRC's Project 211 universities and institutions listed on "World's Best Universities" by *U.S News & World Report*. Since university expansion began on a grand scale in 1998, smaller colleges and universities in China began to merge with much larger neighbouring universities under a state programme. Some universities that had not originally been listed as Project 211 institutions thus managed to become so designated by merging with universities that had been part of the national Project 211. In this analysis, the author took into account the earlier status of universities at the time of the undergraduate studies of these super-rich entrepreneurs. For example, several entrepreneurs graduated from Hangzhou University, which was merged with the more prestigious Zhejiang University in 1998. These individuals were not labelled as graduates from an elite university because they studied at Hangzhou University in the 1980s when it was not designated a Project 211 institution.

**TABLE 4**
**China's Super-Rich: The Highest Educational Level Attained**

| Highest level of education attained | Super-rich entrepreneur | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Pioneer | Newcomer | |
| Junior high school and below | 47 | 4 | 51 |
| | 32.6% | 6.6% | 24.9% |
| Senior high school | 36 | 12 | 48 |
| | 25.0% | 19.7% | 23.4% |
| Junior college | 24 | 12 | 36 |
| | 16.7% | 19.7% | 17.6% |
| Undergraduate | 30 | 23 | 53 |
| | 20.8% | 37.7% | 25.9% |
| Postgraduate | 7 | 10 | 17 |
| | 4.9% | 16.4% | 8.3% |
| Total | 144 | 61 | 205 |
| | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Table 4 provides data on the highest education level achieved by the identified super-rich entrepreneurs. The percentage of college graduates among these rich founders was higher than might be expected. Seventy people or 33.2 per cent of them received full-time university education. Taking junior college into account, this number increased to 106, or 50.2 per cent of the total. Moreover, 17 of the super-rich received graduate education; three had PhD degrees, and two even graduated from a foreign university (Shi Zhengrong from the University of New South Wales and Zhang Chaoyang from MIT). In addition, 43 super-rich founders or 40.6 per cent of all college graduates went to elite universities. This percentage evidently rises to 61.4 per cent if junior college is not taken into consideration. There is certainly a significant percentage

difference in college-level education attainment between the pioneers and newcomers, with newcomers in the super-rich cohort being considerably more educated.

A further analysis of college-educated super-rich entrepreneurs' majors can help better understand the role of human capital. Information is available on the majors of 93 super-rich entrepreneurs with junior-college or higher credentials. The author collected information on the subjects/disciplines these super-rich entrepreneurs studied at college and the industrial sector in which they started their businesses. About six in 10 (56 persons) studied sciences and engineering—seven studied sciences, including six in medical science or pharmacology, while 49 studied engineering. As for the next most popular subjects, 23 entrepreneurs studied social sciences. Most (21 persons) did economics and management, and one each in law and international politics. Beyond sciences and engineering disciplines, 14 entrepreneurs majored in humanities, including Chinese literature, philosophy, foreign literature and arts. The distribution of majors is characteristic of the entrepreneurs' times as students, when sciences and engineering were thought to be more useful for "serving the nation and people".

An obvious question arises as to whether the subjects these super-rich-to-be entrepreneurs studied at college were of relevance to their businesses. The first enterprise that they started might be totally different from their later specialisation or pursuit of excellence, which appears on the rich lists. Hence, careful attention has been paid to determine the first rung on the career ladder. In order to make the data comparable to other standard studies of the Chinese economy, the sectors were recoded according to China's official *Code Book of National Economic Sectors* (middle-level category) instead of simply extracting the data (and descriptions) from the rich lists. In instances where an entrepreneur had multiple businesses, only the most important one was included, although in reality, multiline operations were quite rare at the starting stage.

In sciences, particularly computer science, the subjects of study undertaken usually led directly to business opportunities. Among the 12 entrepreneurs who majored in computer science, only four did not start with computer-related industries and all of the other eight persons were still running IT businesses, as of 2013.

Such consistency in majors and related career fields is also apparent in the medical and pharmaceutical industry. Four out of six super-rich businesspeople in the medical and pharmaceutical industry had studied in the field, and there was also an entrepreneur who started out in manufacturing, but producing medical facilities. One entrepreneur was even a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and the side story of this case study emphasises the skills requirement in this industry. Similarly, the agriculture and forestry industry requires related skills requirement. In sum, four entrepreneurs majored in this field and all started from related industries: one in manufacturing (of agricultural machinery), two in food production and one in the wood-processing industry.

By contrast, almost none of those entrepreneurs, who majored in social sciences and humanities, started from relevant businesses that matched their majors. Instead, the sectors in which these super-rich entrepreneurs first embarked were of different industry types. It is clearly evident that the real estate and construction industries did not seem

to require much knowledge of architecture and civil engineering because 11 of 21 of the super-rich entrepreneurs were students of humanities and economics majors.

Education, particularly higher education, has long been the key to success in one's career. There is a strong relationship between the business field of the super-rich entrepreneurs' first business set-up and their subject specialisation in college. The correlation is straightforward because higher education and major specialisation are important to one's first employment, which will subsequently provide not only the path to one's professional career development (at least for a short while) but also probably lead to a decision to establish a business. To cite an example, Ming Jinxing went to Beijing Union College Hospital, one of China's most prestigious hospitals, as a physician after graduating from a medical college in 1980. Twelve years later, he quit his job, started a company to import medical facilities and equipment from Europe, and sold them to Chinese hospitals. His last immediate position before he started out as a private entrepreneur seems likely to have played an indispensable role in his success.

Ming Jinxing's story, along with many other similar ones, highlights the importance of one's last immediate position held before becoming an entrepreneur with eventual success. Such is the case especially for individuals who had previously worked within the system. Upon analysing information on entrepreneurs' higher education and workplace, there is evidence that confirms college credentials were an important determinant factor for securing a position in the state system (Table 5) before they entered the business world. Most entrepreneurs, who previously worked for the Party-state, held a university or junior college degree. More precisely, 23 out of 24 of them who worked for public institutions (notably schools and hospitals) went to college. College-educated entrepreneurs accounted for 69.2 per cent (18 out of 26) of people who worked within the state system. As for former employees of SOEs, 71.4 per cent (30 out of 42) graduated from higher education. Deeper scrutiny reveals that the 12 people who did not go to college had all been blue-collar workers. In addition, eight out of nine of them, who worked for foreign enterprises, had college credentials, including even doctoral degrees. Six super-rich entrepreneurs started their businesses directly on campus or shortly after graduation. By contrast, only 10 per cent (or five out of 50) of the self-employed went to college. As for former collective enterprise employees, the percentage of college graduates is slightly higher, at 15.6 per cent (five out of 32 persons).

**TABLE 5**
**China's Super-Rich: Higher Education and Workplace**

| **Last position before entering business in:** | **College education** | | **Total** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Party-state-military organ | 8 | 18 | 26 |
| | 30.8% | 69.2% | 100.0% |
| SOEs | 12 | 30 | 42 |
| | 28.6% | 71.4% | 100.0% |

| Last position before entering business in: | College education | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public institutions (e.g. schools, research institutes, hospitals) | 1 | 23 | 24 |
| | 4.2% | 95.8% | 100.0% |
| Collective enterprises | 27 | 5 | 32 |
| | 84.4% | 15.6% | 100.0% |
| Foreign institutions | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| | 11.1% | 88.9% | 100.0% |
| Family enterprises | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| | 50.0% | 50.0% | 100.0% |
| Other private institutions | 4 | 8 | 12 |
| | 33.3% | 66.7% | 100.0% |
| Self-employed | 45 | 5 | 50 |
| | 90.0% | 10.0% | 100.0% |
| School, only for students and fresh graduates | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| | .0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Total | 100 | 105 | 205 |
| | 48.8% | 51.2% | 100.0% |

## SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE ROLE OF FAMILY IN MAKING BILLIONAIRES

Family and social background have clearly played a role in ensuring the emergence of some of the new super-rich entrepreneurs. Some gained stature through marriage and other family relationships, through the influence of overseas relatives, through parental influences, or through less tangible factors such as family histories of wealth or doing business.

Apart from direct inheritance of family privileges, marriage or divorce is usually considered an important way to obtain or expand the fortune of an individual or the family. *New Fortune*'s "Top 500 Rich List 2012"—another influential Chinese rich list besides *Hurun* and *Forbes*—even reported that divorce is increasingly seen as a major means that produces rich women in China. Even so, it is extremely difficult to collect reliable information pertaining the marital status of business elites. According to sporadic reports, among the 211 super-rich in this study, at least one (female) never got married; one (male) cohabits with his partner; four (three males and one female) are divorced; four (males) divorced and remarried; and two (one male and one female) lost their spouses and have not remarried. Except for Chen Jinxia, who inherited her husband's wealth and position after his accidental death, none of these businesswomen, as well as businessmen, was known to have obtained their fortunes merely either through marriage or divorce, although divorce or separation does affect wealth and can jeopardise control of an enterprise (in particular when husband and wife are co-founders of their firm).

Nevertheless, marriage does matter in some cases. Although most husband-and-wife teams created their enterprises together, sometimes only one partner made the difference in the process of "primitive accumulation". A notable example is Zhang Yin

(张茵), who ranked first on *Hurun* in 2006. Although her father was head of a local mine after his retirement from the Chinese military as a captain, Zhang claimed that she did not benefit much from her family because her father was sent to prison during the Culture Revolution. After graduating from a vocational school in accounting and working for a small collective enterprise for a year, she went to Shenzhen, the then relatively new special economic zone, in 1982 to work for a small joint venture. In 1985, she managed to go to Hong Kong, but merely worked as an accountant for a small trading company. The turning point in her career came when she met her husband, Liu Mingzhong who was born in Taiwan but grew up in Brazil, and had been a successful physician and businessman. Zhang's marriage to Liu definitely facilitated her migration to the United States in 1990, and her start-up in the wastepaper recycling business, though it should not be denied that her capability and hard work indeed also contributed to her success.

There are, of course, cases of husbands benefiting from their wife's family. Ding Shizhong is a typical example. Ding's father was a businessman with a factory that made sport shoes, but Ding chose to be a salesman at age 17 in 1987 to sell products of his family's workshop in Beijing. Seven years later, he returned to his hometown and joined his father-in-law's company to produce shoes. Despite holding the top manager position, he did not become the owner and chairman of this company until 2002, when his father-in-law retired.

It goes without saying that parental influence—both direct and in the background—has had important impacts on the making of the super-rich entrepreneurs. The author gathered information on the occupation of entrepreneurs' fathers at the time when they went into business, as tabulated in Table 6. Gathering this information was not easy. Some of the entrepreneurs provided clear information and evidence, including photographs. Others preferred to maintain an air of mystery, sometimes hinting at dark and sensitive backgrounds. There are also some entrepreneurs who grew up as orphans (e.g. Zhang Xiangqing, an iron tycoon now); others grew up in single-parent families (e.g. Huang Hongsheng, one of the biggest electronic equipment producers) or their fathers died young (e.g. Shen Guojun, a financial dealmaker). In such cases, the mother's occupation was taken into consideration in place of father's occupation (Table 6).

**TABLE 6**
**China's Super-Rich: Father's Occupation at the Time of Enterprise Establishment**

| Parental occupation | Super-rich entrepreneur | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Pioneer | Newcomer | |
| High-level cadre | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| | 1.4% | .0% | 1.0% |
| Middle-level cadre | 5 | 5 | 10 |
| | 3.4% | 7.9% | 4.8% |
| Low-level cadre | 15 | 6 | 21 |
| | 10.2% | 9.5% | 10.0% |

| Parental occupation | Super-rich entrepreneur | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Pioneer | Newcomer | |
| Private entrepreneur | 8 | 5 | 13 |
| | 5.4% | 7.9% | 6.2% |
| Intellectual | 25 | 2 | 27 |
| | 17.0% | 3.2% | 12.9% |
| Urban or rural middle class | 10 | 9 | 19 |
| | 6.8% | 14.3% | 9.0% |
| Urban working class | 49 | 8 | 57 |
| | 33.3% | 12.7% | 27.1% |
| Peasant and craftsman | 13 | 13 | 26 |
| | 8.8% | 20.6% | 12.4% |
| Unknown | 20 | 15 | 35 |
| | 13.6% | 23.8% | 16.7% |
| Total | 147 | 63 | 210 |
| | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Some 39.3 per cent (83 cases) of the super-rich entrepreneurs had fathers who belonged to the lower subordinate classes (e.g. workers, peasants, craftsmen) at the point when they went into business (Table 6). According to public records, some were even from extremely impoverished families. Despite certain rural–urban disparities in the figures, there is no apparent difference between pioneers and newcomers.

From Table 6 it can be seen that some 60 per cent of the super-rich entrepreneurs had fathers who came from the elite class, if not necessarily the super-rich. This was particularly the case for those from middle-class backgrounds—i.e. the intellectuals, private entrepreneurs, managers and professionals. While such an association of the middle class with the intellectuals, managers and professionals is common in other countries, the correlation is particularly strong for children of private entrepreneurs. Interestingly, even though the development of private enterprises in the PRC only began in 1984, a number of the super-rich came from a family in which the father was a successful private entrepreneur when they themselves embarked on business. Of course some of these super-rich were co-founders with their father. Fathers who were entrepreneurs themselves had been able to accumulate considerable wealth compared to the majority of the population at the time of informal markets or the so-called underground economy when income levels were low. Clearly, in this regard, parents had a positive influence on the children. Children as co-founders, however, are to be distinguished from the second-generation super-rich who gained family wealth via inheritance.

Table 6 suggests that 15.6 per cent (33) of the super-rich private entrepreneurs came from families in which the father was a cadre of a SOE management team at the time when they set up their own business. The majority of them (21) though were not senior cadres or managers; and there was no major difference in this regard between pioneers and newcomers (15 per cent and 17.4 per cent, respectively). Upon further analysis, only two of the super-rich were observed to have a father who could be

regarded as a high-ranking cadre—one from a "red capitalist family", and the other from "red nobility". Rong Zhijian's father was Rong Yiren, a symbolic figure of the pre-communist grand bourgeoisie, who served as a high official for the Chinese central government after 1949 and became vice president from 1993 to 1998. Wang Jianlin's father was a Red Army revolutionary, who once served as deputy chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Wang Jianlin himself now runs one of the biggest real estate companies in China.

There were 10 super-rich entrepreneurs whose fathers were middle-ranking cadres. Despite the vastly different family profiles and paths to starting businesses, they did benefit considerably from their family background at different stages of their career. On the other hand, the total number of entrepreneurs from middle- and high-ranking cadre families constituted less than six per cent (12) of the 211 cases. Most entrepreneurs' fathers, if they worked for the Party-state system, were low-ranking cadres. There is no clear evidence that these people benefited considerably from their father's political position or connections when they ventured into their businesses.

Some of the super-rich entrepreneurs, in interviews with journalists or in biographies, attributed their success largely to the parenting of their family, especially to parents' emphasis on education. The author gathered information about the relationship between the father's occupation (at the time of their child's business venture) and the educational level of the super-rich entrepreneur (Table 7). Of the 12 super-rich entrepreneurs whose father was a middle- or high-ranking cadre, nine went to college. Wang Jianlin, whose father was a high-ranking official, did not go to college as a full-time student, but joined the army during the Cultural Revolution, apparently due to his father's connections, and obtained a junior-college degree as an "on-the-job" student. As for entrepreneurs from lower-ranking cadre families, however, seven out of 21 did not go to college. This can be largely attributed to the Cultural Revolution when their high school education was interrupted and they were sent to work in the countryside.

**TABLE 7**
**China's Super-Rich: Occupation of Father and Entrepreneur's Education Attainment***

| Father's occupation | College education of Super-Rich Entrepreneur | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | None | Elite College | Non-elite college | |
| High-level cadre | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| | .0% | 2.3% | 1.6% | .9% |
| Middle-level cadre | 3 | 2 | 5 | 10 |
| | 2.9% | 4.7% | 7.9% | 4.7% |
| Low-level cadre | 7 | 4 | 10 | 21 |
| | 6.7% | 9.3% | 15.9% | 10.0% |
| Private entrepreneur | 7 | 4 | 2 | 13 |
| | 6.7% | 9.3% | 3.2% | 6.2% |
| Intellectual | 15 | 4 | 8 | 27 |
| | 14.3% | 9.3% | 12.7% | 12.8% |

| Father's occupation | College education of Super-Rich Entrepreneur | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | None | Elite College | Non-elite college | |
| Urban or rural middle class | 4 | 8 | 7 | 19 |
| | 3.8% | 18.6% | 11.1% | 9.0% |
| Urban working class | 42 | 6 | 10 | 58 |
| | 40.0% | 14.0% | 15.9% | 27.5% |
| Peasant and craftsman | 14 | 4 | 8 | 26 |
| | 13.3% | 9.3% | 12.7% | 12.3% |
| Unknown | 13 | 10 | 12 | 35 |
| | 12.4% | 23.3% | 19.0% | 16.6% |
| Total | 105 | 43 | 63 | 211 |
| | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

*Junior college included in college level.

As expected, a relatively high percentage of entrepreneurs from middle-class families received higher education (Table 7). Of the 27 super-rich entrepreneurs of urban middle-class family origin, 12 went to college. Of the 15 who came from intelligentsia families and went to university, eight went to elite universities. Information gleaned from biographies and interviews highlighted that the super-rich attributed their success in either school or business to a large extent to their family's emphasis on education.

Contrary to general expectations, the proportion of college-educated entrepreneurs from worker-peasant families was not low. Among the 26 super-rich with urban working-class backgrounds, 46.2 per cent (12) went to college, and four even attended elite universities. College-educated entrepreneurs from peasant families accounted for 27.6 per cent (16 out of 58) of their peers. According to research on education stratification,[16] the fairly meritocratic higher education examination system perhaps contributed to this encouraging result.

Family influence in fact extended well beyond the father's occupation and even parental influence as grandparents and other family members also exerted both direct and indirect influences. Chen Ningning, who ranked second in *Hurun* in 2006, is the daughter of a former middle-level cadre. At the same time, her maternal grandfather, Lü Dong, was a high-ranking cadre, serving as minister in several ministries in the central government from the 1950s until the late 1980s. It is widely believed by financial reporters that her success in the export and import of iron and steel could be attributed to the connections of her grandfather's position, particularly, when he was minister of the Ministry of Machine Building. Chen always appears on the rich lists together with her mother, Lü Hui, who holds half the shares in their company.

[16] Li Chunling, "Gaodeng jiaoyu kuozhang yu jiaoyu jihui bu pingdeng" (Expansion of Higher Education and Inequalities of Educational Opportunities), *Shehuixue yanjiu* (*Sociological Studies*), no. 3 (2010): 1–37.

Chen Ningning's story is not an isolated case. The occupations and influence of grandparents are clearly important. As already noted, research in Eastern Europe towards the end of the socialist era and after indicates the possibility of "interrupted embourgeoisment".[17] There is also recent research on China that suggests that many contemporary private entrepreneurs come from families that in one way or another had run businesses before 1949. Revolution and nationalisation during the 1950s turned many into cadres, managers and officials of various kinds, but during the market transition, these backgrounds came into their own again, either as vaguely remembered ideas, family influences, or even in a few cases, long-forgotten skills.[18] The case of Rong Zhijian, as discussed earlier, is indeed a case in point. Rong Yiren, his father, was vice president of the PRC, and one of the wealthiest Chinese capitalists before 1949. Due to his cooperation and fame, Rong Yiren was identified by the CPC as a symbolic "red capitalist" during the 1950s.

In the early 1980s, when the Chinese government changed its national development strategy, a few trusted former capitalists or their children were chosen to establish private companies overseas to attract foreign investment. Even though these companies were politically and economically supported by the state, descendants of the pre-revolution grand bourgeoisie clearly benefited once again. Wang Guangying, founder of the Hong Kong Everbright Bank in 1983, is one such example. Wang was one of the largest industrialists in China during the 1940s, while his sister became the sixth wife of Liu Shaoqi, Mao's second-in-command until 1966. Wang himself was imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution not least because of Liu's downfall. The Everbright Bank is actually controlled by the Beijing-based Everbright Group. Wang Zheng (of no relation to Wang Guangying) is another example. Wang Zheng bought a 52.4 per cent share of Hong Kong Asia Television (ATV) in a move that was believed to have been endorsed by the Chinese government. Wang Zheng's father's foster great-grandfather, Sheng Xuanhuai, was regarded as one of the richest persons in China in the 1900s.

By no means did all the super-rich entrepreneurs grow up in such affluent families, but there are many such stories. Chen Lihua has the most dramatic story. She was born into a family belonging to the "Pure Yellow Banner", the direct descendants of the founding emperors of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Benefiting from the special treatment enjoyed by the former royal family, she lived in the Summer Palace with her father until 1949. Chen's life became somewhat opaque after that and quite unpleasant things reportedly happened to her during the Cultural Revolution. In 1979, she started a business trading in antiques and furniture, allegedly from former royal members and relatives abroad. She then relocated to Hong Kong in 1981 to venture into the real estate business and came back to the PRC in the 1990s as an accomplished businesswoman.

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[17] Szélényi, *Socialist Entrepreneurs*.

[18] Goodman, "New Economic Elites".

Zong Qinghou, the richest person on the *Hurun* rich list in 2010 and 2012, represents another family type—non-communist public servants of the pre-1949 era. Zong's grandfather was the treasury secretary of Zhang Zuolin, one of the most powerful warlords in the 1920s. Zong's father was believed to be a civil servant for the government of the Republic of China. After the communist victory in 1949, his mother, also from a wealthy and large family, had to provide for the family, while his father could not find a job due to his career history. Zong had a hard time working on the farms until 1978 at 33, he finally got a job after his mother, a primary school teacher, retired early and let him replace her as a worker in the school's store. This store, however, provided him with the opportunity and the platform to develop a beverage business, which turned into Wahaha, currently the largest private beverage company in China.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS: POLITICS, EDUCATION AND FAMILY

This article may be the first scholarly endeavour to uncover the social origins of the super-rich in China. The evidence presented in this article refutes the general impression that the richest Chinese are mainly children of the upper class, especially dignitaries.[19] About half of the first generation of the visibly richest Chinese private entrepreneurs came from peasant and worker families—mostly due to the first decade of reform (1978–1989). Nevertheless, it should be noted that not all of them came from humble origins. The remaining half were from middle-class and cadre backgrounds, as well as from families whose wealth had declined due to the establishment of the PRC. Also, about one in 10 of the contemporary super-rich were born into the upper class.

This article also rejects a widespread stereotype of the richest Chinese that they are all uneducated upstarts. Over and above family influences, education and the state's influences are clear factors in determining the emergence of highly successful super-rich entrepreneurs. Education has been a crucial factor. More than half of the first generation of the visibly wealthiest received higher education. At a time when the enrolment rate of higher education was well below 10 per cent, this proportion is quite remarkable.[20] The power of knowledge, measured by the match of the college majoring subject and inaugurating sector, was apparent for graduates in sciences and engineering. Yet the payoff for higher education was not limited to direct skills development. For many entrepreneurs, especially those majoring in social sciences and humanities, college credentials did not help them find a job as businessman directly; instead, they went to college through the then relatively fair and equitable higher education entrance test, and then secured a job inside the system as cadres of the

[19] For example, in 2009, *People's Daily*, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China (CPC), published a comment to refute a prevalent stereotype: more than 91 per cent of the billionaires in China were children or relatives of top officials; see Tang Weihong, "Gaogan zinv zhan fuhao 91% diaocha" (An Investigation of "91% of Super-Rich are Children of High Officials), *People's Daily*, 5 August 2009.
[20] Li, "Gaodeng jiaoyu kuozhang yu jiaoyu jihui bu pingdeng" (Expansion of Higher Education and Inequalities of Educational Opportunities).

Party-state or managers of SOEs after graduation. These two steps were pivotal for their later inauguration of private business.

The benefits of working inside the system are clear but complex, requiring more in-depth research. The evidence is that a high proportion (44 per cent) of the super-rich entrepreneurs had previously held a position (44 per cent) inside the system, but fewer went into business before 1992 than after 1992, nine per cent as against 57 per cent. The advantages of holding positions within the system are evident—market access, related working experience, most importantly, personal connections, especially to officials. On the other hand, apart from several cases that showed contrary results, a majority of the super-rich did not have substantial political ties beyond the local level in the early stages of their business activities, although cooperation and reciprocity with the local state—usually being the dominant party in the partnership—was indeed a key in their success.[21]

This article also attempts to highlight the apparent differences between "pioneers" and "newcomers" in higher education attainment and the types of last immediate jobs held. The "newcomer" super-rich were better educated and more likely to have worked in the state, which actually reflects the changing political and economic climate of China in the 1980s and 1990s.

In sum, there are multiple trajectories to becoming a billionaire: weak political capitalism, capitalism from below, capitalism from above and interrupted embourgeoisement—each trajectory has some supporting evidence. It is impossible to conceptualise a single label (like the "prince party" or "princeling") to fit all descriptions of the richest. The multiple trajectories can be attributed to the fact that China was in a historic moment that availed many opportunities for business success that encouraged people with various social origins to venture into business. It by no means suggests that their family background alone contributed to their successes; the success or failure of entrepreneurs was not so much due to their backgrounds but rather to their choice of business.

Still, the author wants to highlight two caveats in this study. First, there is a universal tendency for billionaires to claim low-income origins. Some Chinese entrepreneurs tend to share with the public the lowly status of his or her family background or his or her difficult life before success, probably to evoke sympathy from people. The author also forewarns readers that this study focuses on the very early lives of the super-rich. For most business elites, their experience as a founder could be fundamentally different from their experience at a later stage of their business' expansion. Particularly, "capitalism from above" or "state-led capitalism" has played a significantly large role in the making of fortunes since the 1990s. Thus, just because some wealthy people did not come from families with strong political connections, this does not mean that many of them did not cultivate political connections and

[21] Jean Oi, *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Lin, "Local Market Socialism".

even use corrupt means to get wealthier. Even for "pioneers" who inaugurated their businesses before 1992, the shadow of the state, both from the local and central levels, should not be underestimated. This article, however, from the very beginning, does not aim to answer questions like how those people made their wealth or why some people become billionaires while others could not. The how-and-why question is important, but it requires richer sets of data and deeper qualitative studies. Interesting future research might look into how businessmen "from the bottom" built their political connections and expanded their business empires.

The second caveat is that this article, in no way, implies that entrepreneurs in the future will emulate the multiple trajectories highlighted in this article. The first generation is fading away. The second generation, according to public materials, is radically different from their parents in many aspects. Pessimists would suggest that a rise of dynastic wealth would generate more social inequalities, and thus jeopardise the Chinese economy. Optimists would refute this by arguing that self-made economic elites will not perish in any growing economy, and grand bourgeoisie remains open even in advanced capitalist societies (like Steven Jobs in the United States). That said, this should be an ongoing project to trace the changing patterns of social mobility in China in the future.

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## APPENDIX: Who are in and out of the data set?

The "visibly richest Chinese private entrepreneurs" is a concept that excludes the following four categories of elites:

(i) Non-corporate elite. Though containing some ambiguities in their early versions, the two rich lists basically only pay attention to Chinese corporate elites after 2003. "Non-corporate elites", such as sport, social and entertainment celebrities, do not appear on the lists, although they might also be extremely wealthy.

(2), Managers. Both *Hurun* and *Forbes* focus almost exclusively on private entrepreneurs, i.e. people who approach the ideal type of the capitalist in classical Marxism, that is, a person who exercises direct and immediate control over property rights. It therefore excludes two groups—i.e. senior managers of giant SOEs and top managers of foreign enterprises. To exclude managers is a correct and necessary approach in terms of class analysis, although their mentality might not be much different from business owners, as many Western researches have proven.

In fact, in both *Hurun* and *Forbes*, we can find several people from the same enterprise, who mostly are big shareholders and founders of their companies at the same time. An extraordinary example is Sanyi, the largest manufacturer of heavy machinery in China. In *Forbes 2011*, its six top managers were listed in the top 500 along with their chairmen. Theoretically speaking, managers becoming owners has been a common practice since the so-called "managerial revolution". These managers can thus be viewed as managerial capitalists or executive capitalists. They are different from traditional entrepreneurial capitalists in many ways, but also occupy capitalist economic locations.

(iii), Business elites with opaque ownership. An interesting observation about Chinese rich lists is that some high-profile Chinese entrepreneurs, perhaps the most influential ones, have never or rarely been listed in either of the two lists because of their ambiguous property rights. They include some business leaders who are virtually founders or "saviours" of companies that for idiosyncratic reasons are still registered as state or collective enterprises. Others were listed once but never appeared again after they strongly protested and even threatened to sue the publishers. Still, some have been listed for years, but their wealth is significantly underestimated because only the "transparent" components are counted. Partly as a response to public criticism about the completeness of the list, *Hurun* published a separate "Power List" from 2005 to 2008 to list those absent business elites who had great influence on China's private economy, including many allegedly "managers of collective enterprises".

(iv) The invisibly richest. Many people, including creators of rich lists, believe that there are huge numbers of rich Chinese business elites who cannot be traced. In addition, many commentators guess that publishers dare not publicise unsupported information on so-called wealthy "princelings", i.e. children of high officials who control massive wealth, much of it hidden, through their military and political connections. Others claim that some rich people manage to prevent their names from appearing in rich lists due to fear of the so-called "curse of the rich list". All these provide reasonable concerns regarding the completeness of the rich lists. On the other hand, "invisible or hidden richest" exist in many societies and should not be an obstacle for researchers to explore. Moreover it is not easy to hide all information systematically if an entrepreneur holds tremendous amounts of "property for power" in today's economic environment. After all, this research focuses on the "visibly richest", not on all of the richest.

For various reasons, both *Hurun* and *Forbes*, especially in their early versions, retained some names that should not be considered as falling into the category of "visibly richest Chinese private entrepreneurs". Based on the author's knowledge, the following cases were removed from the data set:

(i) Residual non-corporate elites. Though both rich lists did not target non-corporate elites, there were still a small number of listed personalities who, in the author's opinion,

should have been considered celebrities more than entrepreneurs. The trick here is that many celebrities are also in fact successful businessmen or women in one way or another. But they are still removed from the author's analysis as long as their major known income does not come from their corporate business.

(ii), Entrepreneurs who were not born in mainland China. *Forbes* publishes a separate list of rich Chinese overseas, like those from Hong Kong and Macao, along with its global rich list, while *Hurun* has excluded them from its domestic rich list. But occasionally, *Forbes* and *Hurun* make mistakes in including some of them into the list. Given the fact that these people grew up in vastly different sociopolitical and economic circumstances, they are excluded from the author's data set.

(iii) Entrepreneurs with extremely murky personal information. The *Hurun*, for several years, has listed big shareholders in some Chinese companies, about whom there is barely any public information. Stories from investigative journalists showed that these mysterious "people" are most likely to be "ghosts" of power elites, who do not want to be known in public, although there are others who might just want to be in "low-profile".

(iv) The second generation. These inheritors were either replaced by the parent or removed from the author's data set because this article discusses only the "first generation of corporate rich".

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# The Social Composition of China's Private Entrepreneurs: Class and Cohort Differences*

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基于中国私营企业调查历年数据，试图回答“私营企业主的社会构成”这一经典命题。经过近40年的发展，私营企业主的总体构成已发生重大变化，市场背景、受过高等教育、非政治党派的构成在上升。通过将私营企业主的职业流动进一步划分成“下海”、“改制”、“跨界”、“跳板”、“草根”等类型，发现大、中、小三种类型的企业主在创业前的职业流动存在显著差异，尤其是大企业主更有可能来自体制内下海或改制，而中小企业主以体制外成长为主。多元回归和系数集束化分析表明，教育程度与政治身份在阶层地位和同期群方面对企业主职业流动产生不同的影响。

**关键词：**私营企业主　职业流动　阶层　同期群

On the basis of survey data on Chinese private enterprises over the years, we try to respond to the classic subject of “the social composition of private entrepreneurs (*siyingqiyezhu* 私营企业主).” In nearly forty years of development, the overall composition of private entrepreneurs has undergone major changes. The group contains a growing proportion of people who have a market background and higher education and are non-political CPCs. On further classifying the occupational mobility of private entrepreneurs into categories such as “*xiahai* 下海” (jump into business), “*gaizhi* 改制”

* Data referred to in this article come from the China Private Enterprise Survey (CPES), a project supported by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the State Administration for Market Regulation and the Private Sector Research Association's Enterprise Research Team of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Research Center for Private Entrepreneurs, which is responsible for the day-to-day management of the CPES database distribution platform, is the database's officially authorized distribution channel. We thank the above bodies for their assistance. The first draft of this paper was read at the Politics-Business Relationship Workshop (Guangzhou, November 2015), the Population and Family in Transitional Society and Stratification Workshop (Jinhua, June 2016) and the Social Stratification and Mobilization Summer Forum (Lanzhou, July 2016). Our thanks are due to Liu Xin, Cao Yang, Wu Yuxiao, Chen Zongshi, Lin Zonghong, Luo Zhongyong, Zhu Bin and other teachers, friends and anonymous reviewers for their criticisms and suggestions. The authors take sole responsibility for their views.

(restructuring), "*kuajie* 跨界" (crossover), "*tiaoban* 跳板" (springboard) and "*caogen* 草根" (grassroots), we find there are significant differences in the occupational mobility of entrepreneurs in large, medium, and small enterprises in terms of what they did before they founded their businesses. In particular, entrepreneurs in large enterprises are more likely to have "jumped into business" from inside the government system or after restructuring, while most small and medium entrepreneurs develop outside the system. Multiple regression and coefficient clustering analysis shows that education level and political status have varying effects on the occupational mobility of entrepreneurs in terms of class and cohort.

**Keywords:** private entrepreneur, occupational mobility, class, cohort

## I. The Problematic: Differences in the Social Background of Private Entrepreneurs

The social composition of private entrepreneurs is an important starting point for understanding changes in Chinese social structure. Many of our ideas on the subject remain at the empirical level of research conducted 20 years ago. In recent years, as private entrepreneurs enter an era of generational replacement, the first generation, the founders, have fallen back to the "second line," while the new generation has come up to the "front desk," making the question of succession highly visible. An endogenous force is changing the social composition of private entrepreneurs. At the same time, the concept of "mass entrepreneurship and innovation" has become a new driving force spurring economic and social development and raising the level of the business environment.

According to the latest data from the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, as of the end of 2016, there were 23,091,900 private enterprises nationwide, an increase of 49.3 percent from the end of 2014 (when there were 5,463,700) and 34 times more than at the end of 1995 (655,000). A constant stream of fresh blood has poured into the ranks of private entrepreneurs. By the end of 2016, the number of private enterprise investors nationwide was 42 million, an increase of 41.7 percent from the end of 2014 (29,631,000), and over 30 times more than at the end of 1995 (1,340,000).

Regrettably, academic research on the social composition of private entrepreneurs has now fallen silent after peaking in the 1990s and early 21st century. Some researchers are no longer satisfied with studying entrepreneurs' occupational mobility,[1] while others feel that the issue may no longer yield fresh findings.[2] However, in our view, the theoretical significance of this topic is evergreen. Class and social formation have become a classic issue for sociological meta-theory (especially Marxist class analysis).[3] What indeed is the composition of market

1 Li Lulu and Zhu Bin, "China's Economic Reform and the Evolution of the Competitive Pattern of Private Entrepreneurs."
2 Victor Nee, "China in Transition," pp. 3-8.
3 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," pp. 461-579.

players and how heterogeneous or homogeneous are they? Not only is this an important empirical issue, it is also directly related to theoretical conclusions about the nature of the entire social structure.

In addition to the dynamic historical dimension, we must also explore static stratification. Within the private entrepreneur group, there is a huge difference in economic position (wealth), political status (power) and social assessment (prestige) and even in subjective status identification.[4] "Private entrepreneur," a concept with strong Chinese characteristics, refers to a group or status. Even among private entrepreneurs, intragroup differences may be as great as the differences between them and other groups. If some large entrepreneurs can be seen as members of the elite class, then many small and medium private entrepreneurs can more aptly be regarded as part of the middle class or as small traders and manufacturers. Accordingly, the second research question to spark our interest: in terms of social origins, do Chinese large, medium and small entrepreneurs come from the same source, or do they have multiple origins? In terms of background, do they constitute a single type or belong to three different types?

The combination of stratification and cohort constitutes our third issue. What are the differences in the social origin of large, medium and small entrepreneurs who set up their businesses in different periods? In other words, what are the differences in the internal composition of the large, medium and small entrepreneurs we see today as compared with those of some decades ago? If there are differences, do they allow us to deduce the existence of a certain trend and thence predict future changes in the make-up of China's private entrepreneurs?

## II. Literature Review

The mobility trajectory of private entrepreneurs before they set up their businesses not only reflects China's changing macroeconomic and social environment, but also outlines the dynamic micro-strategies of individual players. In the course of the transition from a planned to a market economy, many entrepreneurs had abundant experience of occupational mobility before founding their enterprises. From 1997 to 2004, the proportion of private entrepreneurs who had no previous experience of occupational mobility exceeded 10 percent, but the figure fluctuated below 10 percent from 2006 to 2014. The year 2004 was a watershed in terms of the proportion of entrepreneurs who had experienced occupational mobility on one occasion; in the next five surveys, more than 50 percent of entrepreneurs fell into this category. The proportion of those who had been occupationally mobile three times or more had similar

4 Li Lulu, *Private Entrepreneurs in Social Transition: Research on Social Origins and Enterprise Development*; Fan Xiaoguang, "Private Entrepreneurs' Occupational Mobility and Class Identification in China (2004-2014)," pp. 99-119.

characteristics.[5]

Private entrepreneurs experience frequent social mobility, and their origins tend to be complex. Research findings show that in the early period, quite a high proportion of them may have come from the lower ranks of society or marginalized groups,[6] but by the mid-1990s, their origins had diversified. Against this background, a heated debate erupted in the academic community over whether "The majority of private entrepreneurs come from state-owned companies." Some believe that the probability of cadres entering the private economy (mainly to become township entrepreneurs or self-employed) is lessening,[7] but more are of the view that former cadres have better chances of becoming entrepreneurs and that the mainstream of entrepreneurs now consists of cadres and others with managerial and technical experience. Since 2000, this trend has grown stronger. The growth of the private entrepreneur group is, to a large extent, a process of reproduction of elites and quasi-elites.[8] However, some scholars have pointed out that the formation of this group cannot simply be summed as elite reproduction; rather, it involves the coexistence of elite recycling and elite reproduction.[9] Compared with market-type entrepreneurs, people who were privileged insiders had a competitive advantage in relative terms in the early stages of economic reform, but their advantages diminished as reform progressed. The main reason for this was that economic expansion allowed market-type entrepreneurs to seize market opportunities and achieve higher returns.[10] Even today, many large entrepreneurs had an ordinary family background or were working for wages when they started their businesses.[11] This adds to the difficulty of answering such questions as "Who becomes an entrepreneur?" and "Who becomes a big entrepreneur?"

The literature review shows that many of the relevant studies treat entrepreneurs as a homogeneous group or simply divide them into the two categories of "self-employed" and "entrepreneur." Only a few examine private entrepreneurs from different strata within the one analytical framework. Moreover, descriptions and statistics for occupational mobility trajectories are based on cross-sectional data, and multivariate statistical analysis of

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5 Fan Xiaoguang, "Private Entrepreneurs' Occupational Mobility and Class Identification in China (2004-2014)," pp. 99-119.

6 Carolyn L. Hsu, "Cadres, Getihu, and Good Businesspeople: Making Sense of Entrepreneurs in Early Post-Socialist China," pp. 1-38.

7 Victor Nee, "Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets in China," pp. 267-282; Xiaoguang Wu, "Communist Cadres and Market Opportunities: Entry into Self-employment in China, 1978-1996," pp. 389-411.

8 B. Dickson, *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change*.

9 Li Lulu, "Private Entrepreneurs' Personal Backgrounds and Enterprise 'Success.'"

10 Li Lulu and Zhu Bin, "China's Economic Reform and the Evolution of the Competitive Pattern of Private Entrepreneurs."

11 Lü Peng, "'Horatio Alger Myth' in Neoclassical Sociology: The Social Origins of the First Generation of China's Richest Private Entrepreneurs."

comparisons across periods is relatively rare. Finally, there is a lack of in-depth analysis of the factors behind the formation of mobility trajectories. The above shortfalls constitute the theoretical problems this paper endeavors to solve.

## III. Research Design

*1. Data*

We use data from the seventh Chinese Private Enterprise Survey (CPES) (1997-2014) to analyze the occupational status of private entrepreneurs before they set up their businesses. The CPES is carried out nationwide every second year. Its actual conduct relies on Industrial and Commercial Associations and Industrial and Commercial Bureaus at the provincial (autonomous region/municipality) level. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Research Center for Private Entrepreneurs is responsible for the day-to-day management of the data. After data cleaning, a data set with a sample size of 19189 was obtained. The number of subsamples for 1997, 2000, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 was 1419, 2234, 2195, 2674, 3256, 3489 and 3922 respectively.[12]

*2. Operation and measurement*

The occupational mobility of entrepreneurs prior to setting up their enterprises is a dependent variable. In the survey design for the years under study,[13] first, Party and government departments and institutions and state-owned and collective enterprises are regarded as being within the system, while foreign-invested companies, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan enterprises and other private enterprises are regarded as being outside the system. Second, in accordance with redistribution during the transition period and with market segmentation, occupational mobility is divided into five "ideal types": 1) "*xiahai*" (jumping into the sea of business—hereafter, "jumping into business"); 2) "*gaizhi*" (restructuring); 3) "*tiaoban*" (springboard); 4) "*kuajie*" (crossover) and 5) "*caogen*" (grassroots). "Jumping into business" refers to entrepreneurs who only ever worked in Party and government departments and institutions before setting up their enterprises. "Restructuring" refers mainly to entrepreneurs who used to work in state-owned and collective enterprises and people who moved from Party and government bodies to state-owned and collective enterprises and commenced an entrepreneurial career from those positions.[14] The "springboard" type covers

12 Since there are some differences between the occupational mobility surveys for 2004, 2006 and 2016 and the research design of this paper, these years were not analyzed.

13 The design of the occupational mobility instrument in the 1997-2002 survey was slightly different from that of the 2008-2014 survey; we have standardized it.

14 In theory, this type also includes entrepreneurs who initially moved from state-owned and collective enterprises to Party and government organs and institutions and then resigned to start a business. However, such business-to-office job movements are more likely to involve "being promoted" and less likely to involve subsequently starting a business. The proportion in the data is extremely low.

entrepreneurs who worked in a foreign-invested "three capital" enterprise or other private enterprises. The "crossover" type refers to entrepreneurs who have worked both inside and outsidethe system, while the "grassroots" type includes people who had only ever worked as village cadres;[15] the self-employed; laid-off workers; people who sought casual work and other jobs away from home; students returned from abroad; and other forms of occupational mobility. The situation of this last category is more complicated: the "grassroots" label basically refers to "bottom-up market forces."[16]

We divide private entrepreneurs into three kinds according to the size of their enterprises: large, medium and small. From the firm-level location of the entrepreneur's company, we selected for measurement those proxy indicators that had the closest relationship to the firm's asset scale.[17] Specifically, we first divided entrepreneurs into large entrepreneurs and small and medium entrepreneurs on the basis of the standard classification of enterprises above a designated size in the analytical report on the Large-scale Survey on Private Enterprises in China of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (2000-2014). Up to 2000, the threshold was a turnover of 120 million yuan for the year in question; it was 300 million yuan between 2004 and 2011, and rose to 500 million yuan from 2012. We defined owners of firms above the designated size as large entrepreneurs and thus obtained the two groups of large entrepreneurs and small and medium entrepreneurs. For small and medium-sized enterprises, we used the National Bureau of Statistics standards to define as small entrepreneurs the owners of industrial enterprises with a turnover not exceeding 30 million together with owners of other enterprises with a turnover not exceeding 10 million, with the remainder being medium entrepreneurs.

In order to effectively compare the differences among these groups, we constructed three entrepreneur cohorts according to when they set up their enterprises, comprising 1978-1995; 1996-2005; and 2006-2014, with a view to revealing differences in the composition of private entrepreneurs in different cohorts. Our data analysis (Fig. 1) supports the reasonableness of this division.

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15 Those who had only ever worked as village cadres have not been categorized under either "jumping into business" or the "restructuring" of collective enterprises. Although village cadres belong to the grassroots level of political power, the stories of their involvement in the private economy are very different from those of national-level cadres. Village cadres who had simultaneous occupational experience in a (rural) collective enterprise are classified under "restructuring"; otherwise, they are counted as a separate type.

16 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, *Capitalism from Below: Markets and Institutional Change in China*.

17 The actual question in the survey asks for the entrepreneur's "annual salary," but this is an extremely complex issue (many entrepreneurs consider that they do not draw an annual salary). It is thus not appropriate for measuring the scale of their assets. The survey also asks about entrepreneurs' total income throughout the year, but this indicator too is a far cry from the scale of their personal assets.

Figure 1 Changing Trends in Occupational Mobility by Cohort




In addition to the above core variables, we included the following variables: gender, age, education, CPC membership, region, and industry. "Region" is divided into the eastern, central and western regions; "industry" is divided into real and non-real, with the latter referring to firms whose main business is confined to finance, insurance and real estate. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the above variables.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables

| | Small entrepreneurs | Medium entrepreneurs | Large entrepreneurs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Occupational mobility (%) | | | |
| Jumping into business | 5.77 | 8.21 | 9.21 |
| Restructuring | 32.79 | 38.59 | 40.07 |
| Crossover | 27.42 | 23.36 | 23.09 |
| Springboard | 14.26 | 14.14 | 14.21 |
| Grassroots | 19.76 | 15.70 | 13.43 |
| Entrepreneurial cohort (%) | | | |
| 1978-1995 | 27.35 | 23.46 | 28.52 |
| 1996-2005 | 50.07 | 61.41 | 61.82 |
| 2006-2014 | 22.58 | 15.13 | 9.66 |
| Education level (%) | | | |
| Junior high school or less | 19.47 | 13.80 | 11.10 |
| Senior high school | 34.24 | 24.28 | 17.31 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Three-year college education | 30.76 | 36.51 | 32.19 |
| Bachelor's degree or above | 15.54 | 25.40 | 39.40 |
| Political status (%) | | | |
| CPC member | 28.31 | 38.62 | 50.28 |
| Other party member | 4.95 | 7.74 | 8.77 |
| One of the masses | 66.74 | 53.64 | 40.95 |
| Real economy (%) | 4.20 | 7.77 | 7.33 |
| Male (%) | 85.14 | 88.05 | 94.23 |
| Region (%) | | | |
| Eastern region | 52.23 | 60.29 | 62.49 |
| Central region | 24.71 | 19.00 | 18.98 |
| Western region | 23.06 | 20.71 | 18.53 |
| age[1] | 44.73 | 46.27 | 48.26 |
| | (8.62) | (7.85) | (7.73) |
| N | 13, 536 | 4, 752 | 901 |

Note: [1] is the mean value with the standard deviation in parentheses.

*3. Statistical strategy*

Given that occupational mobility is a multi-category variable, we adopt the multi-nomial logit regression model. In the coefficient comparison of the cross-sample regression model, we compare not only level of significance but also the effect of the core independent variables on the dependent variable using the sheaf coefficient method.[18]

## IV. Analytical Findings

*1. The basic characteristics of the occupational mobility of private entrepreneurs*

(1) Diachronic trends in occupational mobility

Fig. 1 reveals the distribution of private entrepreneurs among the five types of occupational mobility in different cohorts between 1978 and 2014.[19] In terms of the distribution of entrepreneurship over the years, the proportion of those who "jumped into business" from officialdom is generally the lowest, being basically less than 10 percent. From 1996 to 2005, this group had a relatively stable share with a slight increase, but thereafter it started to decline. This trend reflects the rise and fall of the "fashion for resigning to start a business"

18 D.R. Heise, "Employing Nominal Variables, Induced Variables, and Block Variables in Path Analysis," pp. 147-173.

19 In order to present the overall trend of change more clearly, the entrepreneurs who started businesses from 1978 to 2014 have been divided into seven cohorts. This is slightly different from the operational methodology for cohorts in the analysis of mechanisms in the following part.

from the 1990s to the beginning of the 21st century.

"Crossover" mobility, both inside and outside the system (movement is mostly from the former to the latter), is to some extent similar to the category above. The proportion of crossover mobility rose slightly between 1978 and 1990, but generally continued a trend that started in 1981of being around 20 percent, with only slight variations. This trend persisted until 1995, when it began to decline. Between 2000 and 2014, the share of crossover mobility basically remained at 10-15 percent. Apart from changing times, another reason for its decline may have been the rapid rise in other forms of occupational mobility trajectories.

Changes in the curve for entrepreneurs who experienced restructuring provides a clearer reflection of the changing times. Firstly, we find that, despite occasional fluctuations in a few years (1985-86 and 1998-99), "restructuring"[20] was a major source of private entrepreneurs in China until 2005. That is, Chinese entrepreneurs came mainly from the ranks of those who had worked in state-owned and collective enterprises—not necessarily in managerial positions. Secondly, there has been a marked decline in the share of restructuring as a source of entrepreneurs starting in 2005. This may have been partly due to changes in the structure of occupational mobility. As well, one cannot rule out the impact of the reform of state-owned enterprises after 2005.

The proportion of entrepreneurs who had worked in other areas of the private sector (had "springboard" experience) was the second largest source of private entrepreneurs until 2005. They represent groups that had never been "inside" the system. Since 2000, there has been a significant and sustained increase in their share. By 2005, it had exceeded the share of "restructuring" and made up almost half the total, becoming the main source of private entrepreneurs.

From 2006, the "grassroots" type also achieved sustained and steady growth. The share of this type fluctuated greatly throughout the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, sometimes being high and sometimes low. Between 1991 and 2005, it hovered between 17 and 18 percent and has been above 20 percent since then. This represents a faithful picture of China's transition to a market economy, which has led to a decline in the share of entrepreneurs from state-owned and collective enterprises and an increase in the share of those from a market background.[21]

(2) Education and occupational mobility

Fig. 2 shows that the share of entrepreneurs with a bachelor's degree or higherkeeps

20 Certainly, state-owned and collective enterprises went to private entrepreneurs varies in intricate and complex situations, including bankruptcy, combination, and merging, and "restructuring" in this article is not equal to "Management Buy-Outs."

21 We are not saying that the "restructuring" type of entrepreneur necessarily represents a transition from being inside the system to being outside it. A great many collective enterprises are actually set up or contracted privately; the classic example is the "red-hat" township and village enterprises. Although nominally collective, they are actually prototype private enterprises. Due to data limitations, it has not been possible to further identify such enterprises.

increasing. Among those who started their businesses in the early 1980s, this group accounted for only a single digit; by the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, they constituted about 20 percent; and in the last five years, they have always constituted more than 30 percent. The proportion of those with three-year college (*dazhuan*) qualifications has also been steadily increasing. It can be said that over time, the educational make-up of private entrepreneurs has taken on a new look.

It is worth noting that the proportion of those with educational qualifications below junior middle school has continued to decline and that the proportion of those with educational qualifications at senior high school level has been relatively stable; both have fluctuated between 30 percent and 35 percent since the mid-1990s. Our analysis shows that most of them are small entrepreneurs. Nearly a third of Chinese entrepreneurs still have senior high school as their highest level of education.

Figure 2 Changing Trend of Political Status and CPC Membership by Cohort (%)




What is the difference in education level among private entrepreneurs at different levels? As can be seen from Table 1, there is a significant difference in the proportion of large, medium and small entrepreneurs with bachelor's degrees or above. For large entrepreneurs, the figure is 39.40 percent; for medium entrepreneurs, 25.40 percent; and for small entrepreneurs, it is 15.54 percent. If combined with three-year college qualifications, the figures are 71.59 percent, 61.91 percent and 46.30 percent respectively. Overall, large entrepreneurs are the most highly educated.[22]

With regard to educational differences in the occupational trajectory of entrepreneurs from different social classes, the proportion with higher education is highest among those who

22 Due to data limitations, it is impossible to establish whether respondents' educational qualifications were obtained before or after they started their businesses.

"jumpd into business" regardless of whether their enterprises are large or small, and there is no marked difference between them. We did not carry out statistical calculations on the occupational rank of the sample, but peer research[23] indicates that the vast majority of highly educated people who worked in Party and government departments have cadre status. In other words, national-level cadres are the main force among entrepreneurs who have "jumped into business." In sharp contrast, among entrepreneurs who came in through "restructuring," those with bachelor's degrees, who had very probably been enterprise managers, had an advantage (41 percent) only among large entrepreneurs. The proportion with senior high school as their highest level of education is highest (32.55 percent) among small entrepreneurs, who were likely to have been ordinary technicians or even manual workers in restructured enterprises before they started their businesses. Among small entrepreneurs, 15 percent have a bachelor's degree. The situation with "springboard," "crossover" and "grassroots" entrepreneurs is similar to that of people who came in through "restructuring." The proportion of large entrepreneurs with higher education is significantly higher than that of small and medium entrepreneurs.

Further comparisons show that regardless of the trajectory of occupational mobility, a later business start up date significantly raised the proportion of university graduates. This indicates that the overall level of education of private entrepreneurs is increasing, with the only exception being the grassroots type. Although the share of different education levels fluctuates in different cohorts, the difference is not marked. The senior high school or three-year college pattern has been maintained for some decades now, showing that most grassroots entrepreneurs (mainly the self-employed and laid-off workers) still have low to medium levels of education.

(3) Party membership and occupational mobility

It is worth exploring trends in the political standing of entrepreneurs who started their own businesses in different years (see Fig. 2). The proportion of CPC members hovered around 25 percent until 1995. After breaking through 30 percent in 1995, it continued to grow, increasing to about 40 percent by 2005. Since then, it has begun to decline. Among entrepreneurs who started their businesses between 2011 and 2014, the proportion of CPC members fell to 16.29 percent. The data for 2014 shows that this proportion is on the rise; subsequent trends will need to be watched.

Although the proportion of other party members fluctuated before 1990, it was quite high in most years at more than 10 percent. Since 1990, however, it has fallen significantly. Our calculations show that this is not entirely because of the rising proportion of CPC members. Starting in 2005, the sum of the shares of CPC and other party members among entrepreneurs began to decline. That is to say, entrepreneurs who started their businesses later are not joining

23 Sun Ming, "Family Background and Cadre Status Acquisition (1950-2003)"; Yu Yang, "From the Nationalization of the Elite to the Elitization of the Nation: A Historical Review of China's Cadre Appointment System."

any party. This may be related to the fact that the increase in the numbers of entrepreneurs added to the private economy each year is out pacing the increase in CPC and other party members.

The descriptive statistics also show that, regardless of the occupational mobility trajectory, the likelihood of an entrepreneur having CPC membership increases with the size of the enterprise. Large entrepreneurs are more likely to be CPC members. Next is "jumping into business" followed by "restructuring" and "crossover." To a greater or lesser extent, these three categories of entrepreneur were insiders. The "springboard" type of entrepreneur has the lowest proportion of CPC members, even lower than the "grassroots" type. This may be related to their having only ever worked outside the system, whereas the "grassroots" category includes village officials who became grassroots entrepreneurs. It should be noted that since key information on the year of joining the CPC was not asked in all survey years, we have to fall back on partial cross-sectional data indicating that most entrepreneurs who grew up outside the system joined the Party after starting a business, whereas a significant proportion of entrepreneurs whose experience lay inside the system joined the Party before starting a business.[24]

The results also show that regardless of the trajectory of their occupational mobility, the proportion of CPC members among entrepreneurs who started their businesses between 1996 and 2005 was significantly higher than that of the previous period (1978-1995). We speculate that this may be related to the fact that private entrepreneurs were allowed to join the Party around the time of the July 1 Speech in 2001. Since then, the absorption of private entrepreneurs into the Party has ushered in a period of institutional encouragement. However, the proportion of CPC members in each group declined in different degrees from 2006 to 2014.

*2. The formative mechanisms behind the occupational mobility of private entrepreneurs*

Table 2 presents the impact of class status on the occupational mobility of private entrepreneurs,[25] with Models 1, 2 and 3 presenting an analysis of the subsamples of entrepreneurs. Analysis of the total sample shows[26] that relative to those who have junior middle school education or less, those with senior high school or three-year college education have less probability of experiencing "jumping into business" and "springboard" mobility and greater probability of experiencing "restructuring," whereas those with a bachelor's degree and above are more likely to experience the "jumping into business" type of mobility. For CPC members, the probability of "jumping into business" is higher than that of "restructuring,"

24 Zhang Houyi and Lü Peng, "Economic Differentiation and Political Change among Private Entrepreneurs," pp. 322-332.

25 In this paper, the missing values in the occupational mobility trajectory and the sample of those who have not experienced mobility are taken as a category and included in the analytical model. The results are basically consistent with those in Tables 2 and 3.

26 Due to space limitations, we have not reported these results here. They may be obtained from the authors.

and "restructuring" in turn is higher than "springboard" mobility. It is worth noting that compared to small entrepreneurs, the probability of medium-level entrepreneurs having experienced "springboard" mobility is 84.95 percent of the number who experienced "restructuring," but there is no significant difference between big and small entrepreneurs. At the same time, there are no significant differences among entrepreneurs in the probability of "jumping into business" and "crossover" mobility. This shows that there is still inherent heterogeneity in the occupational mobility of different entrepreneurs after other variables have been controlled, which reminds us that it is necessary to analyze the formative mechanisms of the subsamples.

The results of the subsample regression analysis are as follows. First, among small entrepreneurs (Model 1), those with a bachelor's degree or above are more likely to belong to the "jumping into business" type ($p < 0.05$); and other entrepreneurial types (Models 2 and 3) do not exhibit similar characteristics ($p > 0.1$). Among large entrepreneurs, the effect of level of education is not significant. In terms of the political status effect, the status of CPC member has a significant effect on small entrepreneurs' decision to "jump into business." Other subsamples failed to pass statistical tests. Secondly, relative to those with primary school education or below, the probability of small entrepreneurs with a bachelor's degree or above experiencing "springboard" mobility are significantly lower, but this is not significant among big entrepreneurs. For small entrepreneurs, CPC membership lessens the probability of experiencing "springboard" mobility, an effect that is stronger for large enterprises. The effect of belonging to a democratic party is similar. Thirdly, having a three-year college degree or above has a significant positive effect on "crossover" mobility among small entrepreneurs, but not among large and medium entrepreneurs ($p > 0.1$). Finally, the positive effect of level of education on "grassroots" mobility is significant among small and medium entrepreneurs, but there is no similar finding for big entrepreneurs.

Table 2 Comparison of Factors Influencing Occupational Mobility by Class Status

| Model 1 | Jumping into business vs restructuring | Springboard vs restructuring | Crossover vs restructuring | Grassroots vs restructuring |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Senior high school | -0.462*** | -0.311*** | -0.046 | -0.467*** |
| | (0.128) | (0.070) | (0.085) | (0.069) |
| Three-year college | -0.229+ | -0.256*** | 0.242** | -0.818*** |
| | (0.123) | (0.072) | (0.088) | (0.074) |
| Bachelor's degree or above | 0.337* | -0.287** | 0.465*** | -1.282*** |
| | (0.132) | (0.088) | (0.111) | (0.099) |
| CPC member | 0.616*** | -0.458*** | 0.094 | -0.459*** |
| | (0.084) | (0.056) | (0.063) | (0.059) |
| Other party member | 0.365* | -0.136 | -0.126 | -0.460*** |
| | (0.167) | (0.107) | (0.130) | (0.129) |
| Log-likelihood | -18,361 | -18,361 | -18,361 | -18,361 |

| N | 13,536 | 13,536 | 13,536 | 13,536 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 2 | Jumping into business vs restructuring | Springboard vs restructuring | Crossover vs restructuring | Grassroots vs restructuring |
| Senior high school | -0.576** | -0.006 | 0.014 | -0.204 |
| | (0.199) | (0.145) | (0.175) | (0.144) |
| Three-year college | -0.689*** | -0.294* | -0.089 | -0.896*** |
| | (0.189) | (0.140) | (0.167) | (0.144) |
| Bachelor's degree or above | 0.109 | -0.263+ | 0.188 | -1.452*** |
| | (0.194) | (0.156) | (0.185) | (0.175) |
| CPC member | 0.097 | -0.531*** | -0.139 | -0.654*** |
| | (0.121) | (0.088) | (0.101) | (0.100) |
| Other party member | -0.375 | -0.352* | 0.145 | -0.592** |
| | (0.235) | (0.153) | (0.166) | (0.191) |
| Log likelihood | -6,514 | -6,514 | -6,514 | -6,514 |
| N | 4,752 | 4,752 | 4,752 | 4,752 |
| Model 3 | Jumping into business vs restructuring | Springboard vs restructuring | Crossover vs restructuring | Grassroots vs restructuring |
| Senior high school | -0.608 | -0.330 | 0.220 | -0.076 |
| | (0.523) | (0.384) | (0.479) | (0.417) |
| Three-year college | -0.278 | 0.095 | 0.492 | 0.123 |
| | (0.521) | (0.374) | (0.468) | (0.421) |
| Bachelor's degree or above | -0.267 | -0.482 | 0.251 | -0.259 |
| | (0.526) | (0.394) | (0.493) | (0.443) |
| CPC member | 0.301 | -1.041*** | -0.221 | -0.609** |
| | (0.296) | (0.207) | (0.240) | (0.236) |
| Other party member | 0.091 | -0.643+ | -0.275 | -0.476 |
| | (0.487) | (0.335) | (0.403) | (0.404) |
| Log-likelihood | -1,207 | -1,207 | -1,207 | -1,207 |
| N | 901 | 901 | 901 | 901 |

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; The above models control for the variables of gender, age, age square, region, industry, survey year and entrepreneurial cohort.

The overall impact of entrepreneurial cohort on the occupational mobility of private entrepreneurs is reported in Table 3. Models 4, 5 and 6 provide the subsample analysis of the three cohorts of 1978-1995, 1996-2005 and 2006-2014 respectively. Overall, the more highly educated entrepreneurs are, the more likely they are to experience "jumping into business" or "restructuring" forms of mobility. Similarly, CPC membership has a positive effect on mobility from the state-owned sector. There is no significant difference in terms of "jumping into business" and "restructuring" between the 1996-2005 cohort and the 2006-2014 cohort compared with entrepreneurs who started their businesses from 1978 to 1995. However, entrepreneurs were more likely to belong to the "restructuring" type of mobility for the period 1996-2005, and to the "springboard" type for the period 2006-2014.

Specifically, first of all, compared to restructuring, education level does not have a substantial impact on the "jumping into business" experience of entrepreneurs in 1978-1995 (Model 4). However, senior high school or three-year college education had a significant negative effect on the 1996-2005 entrepreneurial cohort (Model 5), while having higher education shows an advantage for "jumping into business" for the 2006-2014 cohort (Model 6). Secondly, education level's inhibition effect on "springboard" mobility is weakened to different degrees in all cohorts, but its inhibition effect on "grassroots" mobility remains stable. Thirdly, CPC membership did not have a significant effect on "jumping into business" mobility for those who started businesses in 1978-1995 ($p > 0.1$), but it had a significant positive effect on the other two cohorts. The status of CPC member shows a stable inhibition effect on "springboard" and "grassroots" mobility. Finally, the status of other party member has a negative effect on the "springboard" or "grassroots" mobility of the 1996-2005 entrepreneur cohort; the 2006-2014 cohort is similar.

Table 3 Comparison of Factors Influencing Occupational Mobility by Cohort

| Model 4 | Jumping into business vs restructuring | Springboard vs restructuring | Crossover vs restructuring | Grassroots vs restructuring |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Senior high school | -0.163 | -0.378*** | 0.010 | -0.382*** |
| | (0.234) | (0.106) | (0.117) | (0.107) |
| Three-year college | 0.015 | -0.300** | 0.234$^{+}$ | -0.656*** |
| | (0.229) | (0.115) | (0.128) | (0.120) |
| Bachelor's degree or above | 0.326 | -0.495** | 0.084 | -0.822*** |
| | (0.259) | (0.167) | (0.201) | (0.175) |
| CPC member | 0.178 | -0.308** | 0.079 | -0.179$^{+}$ |
| | (0.164) | (0.096) | (0.101) | (0.099) |
| Other party member | -0.149 | 0.014 | -0.217 | -0.213 |
| | (0.277) | (0.147) | (0.173) | (0.166) |
| Log-likelihood | -6,753 | -6,753 | -6,753 | -6,753 |
| N | 5,074 | 5,074 | 5,074 | 5,074 |
| Model 5 | Jumping into business vs restructuring | Springboard vs restructuring | Crossover vs restructuring | Grassroots vs restructuring |
| Senior high school | -0.664*** | -0.181* | -0.009 | -0.286*** |
| | (0.129) | (0.0869) | (0.108) | (0.086) |
| Three-year college | -0.569*** | -0.238** | 0.152 | -0.646*** |
| | (0.121) | (0.085) | (0.106) | (0.087) |
| Bachelor's degree or above | 0.128 | -0.297** | 0.413*** | -1.079*** |
| | (0.128) | (0.10) | (0.124) | (0.111) |
| CPC member | 0.460*** | -0.488*** | -0.044 | -0.568*** |
| | (0.085) | (0.061) | (0.071) | (0.066) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Other party member | 0.123 | -0.227+ | 0.204 | -0.648*** |
| | (0.166) | (0.116) | (0.133) | (0.148) |
| Log-likelihood | -14,071 | -14,071 | -14,071 | -14,071 |
| N | 102,53 | 10,253 | 10,253 | 10,253 |
| Model 6 | Jumping into business vs restructuring | Springboard vs restructuring | Crossover vs restructuring | Grassroots vs restructuring |
| Senior high school | -0.029 | -0.178 | 0.060 | -0.786*** |
| | (0.324) | (0.178) | (0.267) | (0.165) |
| Three-year college | 0.279 | -0.190 | 0.264 | -1.388*** |
| | (0.307) | (0.175) | (0.260) | (0.169) |
| Bachelor's degree or above | 0.796* | -0.241 | 0.435 | -2.058*** |
| | (0.311) | (0.182) | (0.265) | (0.191) |
| CPC member | 0.516** | -0.675*** | 0.169 | -0.642*** |
| | (0.157) | (0.107) | (0.129) | (0.121) |
| Other party member | 0.308 | -0.485* | -0.089 | -0.695* |
| | (0.349) | (0.235) | (0.299) | (0.304) |
| Log-likelihood | -5,156 | -5,156 | -5,156 | -5,156 |
| N | 3,862 | 3,862 | 3,862 | 3,862 |

Notes: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$; All models control for the variables of gender, age, age square, region, industry, survey year and class.

In order to further compare the effects of education level and political status on the occupational mobility trajectory of private entrepreneurs, we introduce a clustering method to the conduct of our estimation. As shown in Table 4, in the comparison between "jumping into business" and "restructuring," the effect of education level on "jumping into business" experience for medium-level entrepreneurs is significantly higher than the effect of political status (0.353 vs 0.120). Among entrepreneurs who started their businesses between 1978 and 1995, the effect of education on "jumping into business" or "restructuring" varied considerably (0.133/0.084 = 1.58), but the difference was slighter for the 1996-2005 and 2006-2014 cohorts (1.52, 1.45). With "springboard" mobility, the effects of political status and education level increased with the entrepreneur's social class, but the education level effect was the only one to grow with on the length of time since the business was founded. In "crossover" mobility, the education level effect grew stronger with on the length of time since the business was founded, and the political status effect was relatively weak. In "grassroots" mobility, the effect of political status was stronger than that of education among big entrepreneurs. In terms of the entrepreneur cohorts, the relative advantage of the education level effect increased for the 1996-2014 cohort.

Table 4 Comparison of Effect Values Affecting Occupational Mobility

| | Jumping into business vs restructuring | Springboard vs restructuring | Crossover vs restructuring | Grassroots vs restructuring | Jumping into business vs restructuring | Springboard vs restructuring | Crossover vs restructuring | Grassroots vs restructuring |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Small entrepreneurs | | | | 1978-1995 | | | |
| Education level | 0.275*** | 0.115*** | 0.187*** | 0.403*** | 0.133* | 0.168*** | 0.102* | 0.273*** |
| Political status | 0.277*** | 0.204*** | 0.053* | 0.216*** | 0.084 | 0.137*** | 0.071 | 0.090* |
| | Medium-level entrepreneurs | | | | 1996-2005 | | | |
| Education level | 0.353*** | 0.135** | 0.108* | 0.532*** | 0.332*** | 0.093** | 0.157*** | 0.357*** |
| Political status | 0.120* | 0.254*** | 0.085+ | 0.321*** | 0.219*** | 0.231*** | 0.053* | 0.288*** |
| | Large entrepreneurs | | | | 2006-2014 | | | |
| Education level | 0.165 | 0.258* | 0.155 | 0.163 | 0.330*** | 0.070 | 0.159** | 0.657*** |
| Political status | 0.145 | 0.495*** | 0.114 | 0.292* | 0.228*** | 0.295*** | 0.08 | 0.293*** |

Notes: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$; no standard error has been reported.

## V. Summary and Discussion

Our analysis of national sample survey data from 1997 to 2014 enables us to draw overall conclusions on the origins of private entrepreneurs. Over the past forty years, the proportion of entrepreneurs who worked inside the system has declined after a period of growth, while the proportion of entrepreneurs who come from outside the system has risen sharply. Although the proportion of entrepreneurs with senior high school education has remained at around 30 percent, the proportion of those with higher education has increased each year. The proportion of CPC members has trended downwards from a peak to a gentle decline. Meanwhile, more and more people with market backgrounds, high levels of education and no party affiliation have joined the ranks of private entrepreneurs. A difference from the research findings of the mid-1990s is that the "insider coloration" of the private entrepreneur group has begun to decline slowly after a period of growth.

Unlike earlier entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs with a university education background are increasingly entering the market directly, rather than joining the system (the government or state-owned enterprises) before "jumping into business." With the exception of the "grassroots" type of entrepreneur, university degree holders have been an increasing proportion of the total for all types of entrepreneurs. This shows that although the proportion of "grassroots" entrepreneurs with limited education is still relatively high, the overall education level of entrepreneurs is rising. Compared to those who were outside the system, entrepreneurs with inside experience have an advantage in terms of education and CPCship and this advantage

has not evaporated over time. Our analysis of them echanisms behind mobility trajectories shows that relative to "restructuring" experience, education level has the same/stronger effect on small and medium entrepreneurs who experienced "jumping into business," whereas its effect on large entrepreneurs is not significant; however, among the latter the effect of political status on "grassroots" mobility is stronger than that of education level. At the same time, among entrepreneurs who started their businesses between 1978 and 1995, education had only a slight effect on most experiences of occupational mobility (except for the "springboard" type), but its effect increased for the 1996-2005 and 2006-2014 cohorts. The effect of CPC membership on the "springboard" type of mobility grew depending on the length of time since the business was started.

In addition, although entrepreneurs' occupational mobility shows obvious differentiation, the origins of entrepreneurs from different social classes have not yet "solidified," but maintain a diversified pattern. Whatever their type, entrepreneurs had a diversity of occupational experience before starting their businesses, and this diversity has persisted over time. This shows that China's private economy still maintains a certain degree of openness. Different social groups can join the private sector, and people from different social origins can become large and medium entrepreneurs. In other words, economic expansion can still provide a stage for late comers who have seized market opportunities. This finding has been confirmed from different angles in other empirical studies.[27]

Our study reveals the influence of the micro-mechanisms of education and politics on the status of private entrepreneurs, although this does not constitute a causal relationship. Changes in the social composition of private entrepreneurs reflect macro-level institutional change. For example, the proportion of elites from inside the system who enter the private sector is decreasing, which indicates that the temptation to "resign and go into business" is declining for public sector officials as benefits within the system are institutionalized. The proportion of people with higher education who enter the private sector directly after graduation has risen rapidly since 2000, largely because of higher education reform and significant changes to the supply and demand situation in the primary labor market since 1999. These changes have led to more private enterprises, especially small and medium-sized ones, becoming the main market for graduate employment and entrepreneurial activity. In particular, national policies in recent years have increased incentives and support for entrepreneurship. In short, at different times the institutional environment has provided different structural opportunities that allow people from different social backgrounds to become entrepreneurs.

We believe there are two policy implications to be drawn from the above analysis of China's private enterprise survey data. On the one hand, we see the maintenance of entrepreneurs' diverse social origins and the tensions in their intergenerational transmission. One of the main factors affecting their future composition is the continuation of "stock," as shown in the

27 Lü Peng, "'Horatio Alger Myth' in Neoclassical Sociology: The Social Origin of the First Generation of China's Richest Private Entrepreneurs."

extent to which the existing entrepreneurial ranks can reproduce through intergenerational transmission. In some family businesses, the younger generation are reluctant to carry on the business and instead "head overseas." On the whole, however, familial inheritance is the mainstream mode among local entrepreneurs,[28] while a series of measures including supply-side structural reform and "building a new type of political and business relationship" have played a positive role in stabilizing the investment and confidence of local entrepreneurs. The second is the incremental continuance of opening; that is, the extent to which market opening and access can encourage individuals from different backgrounds to plunge into the private economy and develop and expand in the market. On the other hand, the differentiation of entrepreneurs' social origins in terms of enterprise type may have political and social consequences. If this differentiation breaks through certain limits, it may lead to a widening of differences in the behaviors and attitudes of the entrepreneur group. This is especially true of interest claims and expressions.

We also believe that the changes in the composition of private entrepreneurs will have direct and indirect effects on the entire social structure. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, private sector workers constituted 3.5 percent of the total number of employed persons in 1990, but this figure had increased to 40.85 percent in 2015—more than a third of the total, and accounting for 78.29 percent of the urban employed population. It is clear that structural changes among employers (private entrepreneurs) and the associated changes in industrial and corporate governance structure and culture will eventually become a new driving force shaping the middle-income group and the working class.

Our national-level analysis outlines a positive picture for future structural changes among the private entrepreneur group. At present, China's economic structure is undergoing an arduous adjustment, but it is precisely this process that has given the entrepreneur group a new impetus. The market has opened doors for a growing number of people, especially young people with human capital. They are more likely to be the "tide players" who seize opportunities in the new round of economic transformation and upgrading, entering the market directly rather than using the system as a springboard. We believe that no time in the last century of China's history has offered such strong opportunities as today for diverse groups to invest in the market. One could say that we have ushered in a new era of transition in which the vitality within the system and the market is being fully exploited.

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28 Lü Peng and Fan Xiaoguang, "The Two-Track Path of Intergenerational Reproduction of Elite Status in China (1978-2010)."

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